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This work represents my efforts to rethink the conspicuous relationship between 
philosophical materialism and contemporary rhetorical studies along the lines of the 
speculative materialism outlined (primarily) in Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude. 
Such an effort represents, for me, an engagement with an institutional problematic on 
both practical and historical-theoretical levels. With that in mind, I have constructed my 
argument in two parts. Cast as an allegory to Michael Calvin McGee’s influential essay 
“A Materialist’s Conception of Rhetoric,” the first portion of this work examines the 
historical evolution of theories of materialist rhetoric as a response to an antecedent turn 
towards hermeneutics in rhetorical criticism. I claim that, although they represent 
complex institutional responses to the contemporary hermeneutic tradition in rhetoric, 
what have been called “materialist” theories of rhetoric do not fundamentally escape that 
tradition, and therefore have very little to do with materialism. In part two, I examine 
Slavoj Zizek’s speech at Occupy Wall Street on October 9, 2011. In doing so I uncover 
some analytical difficulties that the “human microphone” poses for both “hermeneutic” 
and “materialist” rhetoric, and offer alternative connections to philosophy as new ways 
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PART ONE: A (SPECULATIVE) MATERIALIST’S CONCEPTION OF RHETORIC 
 
The contemporary history of “materialist rhetoric” is the opposite of the broader 
history of rhetoric. The broader history of rhetoric, for example, is saturated by the 
gravity of a history which dates back to pre-Socratic Greece.
1
 Even “modernist” 
iterations of this history are bound up in reading more “contemporary” thought through 
its relation to this tradition.
2
 What does exist of the scant history of a materialist rhetoric 
is itself questionable, given an inconclusive conception of the term. As Michael Calvin 
McGee puts it, “[w]ith the possible exception of Kenneth Burke, no one I know of has 
attempted to formally advance a material theory of rhetoric.”3 Certainly it is the case that 
such a history has expanded since McGee’s seminal essay.4 Materialist rhetoricians, 
however, still battle a very different problem: overwhelmed by the multiplicity of the 
human practice of rhetoric, the search for rhetorical theory has turned to an attempt to 
                                                 
1
 Michael Calvin McGee, “A Materialist’s Conception of Rhetoric,” in Rhetoric, Materiality and Politics, 
eds. Barbara Biesecker and John Lucaites (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 17.  
2
 Some notable examples include: John Bender and David Wellbery, “Rhetoricality: On the Modernist 
Rhetoric of Rhetoric,” in The Ends of Rhetoric: History, Theory, Practice, eds. John Bender and David 
Wellbery (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1990), 3-39. ; Edwin Black, “Excerpts from Rhetorical 
Criticism: A Study in Method,” in Readings in Rhetorical Criticism, ed. Carl Burgchardt (State College: 
Strata Publishing, 2010), 55-67.; Hans Georg Gadamer, “On the Scope and Function of Hemenuetical 
Reflection,” in Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy, ed. Bruce Wachterhauser (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1986), 277-299.   
3
 McGee, “A Materialist’s Conception of Rhetoric,” 19.  
4
 Some notable examples include: Carole Blair, “Reflections on Criticism and Bodies: Parables from Public 
Places,” Western Journal of Communication 65, no. 3 (2001): 271-294.; Dana Cloud, “Materiality of 
Discourse as Oxymoron: A Challenge to Critical Rhetoric,” Western Journal of Communication 58, no. 3 
(1994): 141-163. Ronald Walter Greene, “Another Materialist Rhetoric,” Critical Studies in Mass 
Communication 15,  no. 1 (1998): 21-41.; Ronald Walter Greene, “Rhetorical Materialism: The Rhetorical 
Subject and the General Intellect,” in Rhetoric, Materiality and Politics, eds. Barbara Biesecker and John 
Lucaites (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 43-66.; Christian Lundberg, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and 
the Science of Rhetoric (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2012). 
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“formally account for what seems to be an essential part of the human social condition.”5 
To that end, materialist rhetoricians are in search of a theory that “thinks of rhetoric as an 
object, just as material and as omnipresent as air and water.”6 Such a theory is only 
formal, however, if it can adequately describe the materiality of rhetoric; its status as 
embodied “rather than merely representational of mental and empirical phenomena.”7 But 
what is this so called “material” in the new materialist rhetoric?  
Today, the typical theoretical concern with daily rhetorical practice stems in one 
way or another from a Marxist notion of historical materialism, and the cutting edge of 
rhetorical criticism entails a description of the body as a materialization of rhetorical 
practice. The terms “Marxist… historical” and “body as” presume common knowledge of 
“materialism.”8 The knowledge which is presumed, I think, is of a “materialism” which is 
not worthy of the name, since it does not insist on a philosophical absolute which is “at 
once external to thought and in itself devoid of all subjectivity.”9 This phenomenon is not 
a new one, though until now it has been associated with an inseparability of the social 
from the material. So when Matthew May wrote that the practice of soapbox oratory is a 
“material staging ground through which the repetition of certain bodily practices holds 
together in a kind of dynamism that lasts at least long enough to mark an impression, not 
                                                 
5
 McGee, “A Materialist’s Conception of Rhetoric,” 18.  
6
 Ibid., 19.  
7
 Ibid., 19.  
8
 The latter of these, at the very least, also appears to presume a particular definition of rhetoric. I am 
hesitant to implicate this assumption, however, since it is my intent to demonstrate the way in which the 
presumed definition of materialism here constitutes a parallel definition of rhetoric.  
9
 Quentin Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative Analysis of the Meaningless 
Sign,” trans. Robin Mackay (presentation, Freie Universitat, Berlin, Germany, April 20, 2012), 2.  
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only in its own present but also in its potential for spreading out in concentric circles of 
time and space from its immediate point of application,” he simultaneously made the 
argument that the repetitive act of discoursing-in-a-body is the condition of possibility for 
once-and-future activation of some trans-historical revolutionary spirit.
10
 The body 
becomes rhetoric as object. It is the nexus point through which the “material” is held 
together as impression. It is not enough, however, to conceive of rhetoric as object for 
rhetoric to accede to materialism. One must also be able to conceive of objects without 
rhetoric in order to assert the historical capacity of objects to be rhetorical. When the 
content of a “reading of class struggle into rhetorical history” asserts the trans-historicity 
of that struggle, and when the practical implication of that reading is “a performative 
enactment in which the potential of a new world becomes imaginable in the ashes of the 
old,” then the implicit claim is that the capacity of laborers to control the means of their 
own production is dependent on the occurrence of rhetorical production though which the 
new world can be typified: it isn’t a revolution until its composition can be retroactively 
identified by the ashes of its historical diffusion.
11
 What has been called “object” through 
much of this tradition is thus not about objects at all, but rather a way of seeing objects as 
inseparable from the process of their becoming-rhetorical.  
What appears, in materialist rhetoric, to be the obvious alternative is to believe 
that relations “come first,” that the essential characteristic of a “materialist” ontology of 
rhetoric does not treat rhetoric as an object but instead locates the reality of the 
                                                 
10
 Matthew May, Soapbox Rebellion: The Hobo Orator Union and the Free Speech Fights of the Industrial 
Workers of the World, 1909-1916 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2013), 10. 
11
 May, Soapbox Rebellion, 1-5.  
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becoming-rhetorical of this or that body assemblage in the very moment of its 
enunciation. The problem posed by such an alternative is the classic confrontation 
between philosophical logics of difference and identity. Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari’s re-reading of Bergson in A Thousand Plateaus puts the question vividly:  
Becomings-animal are neither dreams nor phantasies. They are perfectly real. But which 
reality is at issue here? For if becoming animal does not consist in playing animal or 
imitating an animal, it is clear that the human being does not "really" become an animal 
any more than the animal "really" becomes something else. Becoming produces nothing 
other than itself. We fall into a false alternative if we say that you either imitate or you 
are. What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed 
terms through which that which becomes passes. Becoming can and should be qualified 
as becoming-animal even in the absence of a term that would be the animal become. The 
becoming-animal of the human being is real, even if the animal the human being 
becomes is not; and the becoming-other of the animal is real, even if that something other 
it becomes is not. This is the point to clarify: that a becoming lacks a subject distinct from 
itself; but also that it has no term, since its term in turn exists only as taken up in another 
becoming of which it is the subject, and which coexists, forms a block, with the first. This 
is the principle according to which there is a reality specific to becoming (the Bergsonian 




We might begin the construction of “materialist” rhetorical theories with “real speeches,” 
but if we then aim at the “description, explanation, perhaps even prediction of the 
formation of consciousness itself,” we have lost the ability to say that rhetoric is an 
object.
13
 May’s “materialist” theory of rhetoric therefore relies on the notion of rhetorical 
practice as a limiting apparatus, since it solidifies the virtual into the actual. It is never an 
object, but rather the way in which objects come to be as such through the collective 
assembly of enunciation. A speculative materialist theory of rhetoric, in contrast, begins 
with the ontological plurality of objects which are necessarily subject to contingency. 
Such an approach to rhetorical theory would not aim at making enunciation into a theory 
                                                 
12
 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 238.  
13
 McGee, “A Materialist’s Conception of Rhetoric,” 18-19.  
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of limitation or of the severing of the virtual and actual, but rather into a theory of 
generation which folds the actual onto the potential.
14
  
With the possible exception of Quentin Meillassoux, no one I know of has 
attempted to formally advance a speculative theory of materialism. The task is imposing, 
for in many ways the whole world of rhetorical theory would have to be turned upside-
down to resolve a host of complicated philosophical issues. The “kenotypical” capacity 
of rhetoric will become a cornerstone of theory-building rather than an interesting 
alternative approach to criticism. Rhetorical experience, even thought itself, will have to 
be characterized as a historical phenomenon which was preceded by a world which bore 
no resemblance to it. Such difficult and controversial concepts as “consciousness” and 
“ideology,” “ancestrality” and “necessity” will have to be explored. Various methods of 
rhetorical research and theory building will have to be examined, and the mystifications 
of “context” and “hermeneutics” resolved and eliminated. Since none of this could occur 
without asserting the necessity of contingency, it also will be necessary at every point to 
justify similarities between a “materialist” and “hermeneutic” rhetoric on the basis of a 
persistent correlation between thinking and Being. Finally, since no rhetoricians have 
been essentially concerned with a definition of material which is itself not rhetorical, 
apparently heretical rhetorical adaptations of such concepts as “necessity” and “ideology” 
                                                 
14
 Here I exchange the word “virtual” with the word “potential,” for a particular reason, which I will return 
to later on: when “materialist” rhetoricians (such as May or Greene), they often refer to the virtual as an 
unassailable plain of differences, which are not yet “assembled” in this or that way (as this or that text). The 
identity of objects under such an interpretation, borrowing from Deleuze, depends on the ontological 
priority of difference. In other words, difference precedes identity. For Meillassoux, speculative 
materialism provokes an understanding of identity/difference as existing in an endlessly oscillating binary 
which progresses alongside the finitude of objects. 
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will have to be justified against methodological purists from both of rhetoric’s 
“traditions.”15  
Because it is the most direct strategy, I do not blush to advertise this essay as an 
exercise in fundamental conceptualization: I want to define the term “rhetoric” from a 
speculative materialist perspective. My concern is with the creation and application of 
rhetorical theories. I do not ask the question What is rhetoric? so much as the question 
What makes rhetoric possible? The alternative to a rhetorical correlationism (whether it 
be of the hermeneutic or “materialist” variety), I argue, is to think of rhetoric as a 
capacity derived from the materiality of language.
16
 Just as the hard sciences and 
theoretical mathematics are controlled by the capacity of matter to be other, so a theory of 
rhetoric can be materialist only when derived from the role of the kenotype in the 
functioning of language.  
(Hermeneutic) Correlationism in Rhetoric Defined 
John Bender and David Wellbery give a detailed account of what they believe to 
be the genesis of a modern rhetorical tradition after the destruction of (what had hitherto 
been) the study of rhetoric at the hands of Romantic and Enlightenment thought. In 
evolving from the oratorical tradition of antiquity, rhetoric had, by the time of Kant, 
expanded into a role that could not contain the conceptual frameworks of both “science” 
                                                 
15
 My reference to “materialist” and “hermeneutic” rhetorical practices is largely a gesture towards terms 
which have been used to describe an institutional history that bears a particular orientation to the 
relationship between text and context. 
16
 Although this phrase alone is worth a great deal of discussion, such a discussion might not be productive 
(at least as far as I am concerned) without laying some substantial groundwork. I will have occasion to 
return to the phrase “materiality of discourse” (albeit in very specific way), though, and what I have to say 
until then is merely the “groundwork” to which I am referring.  
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and “art.” Moreover, Kant’s “Copernican revolution” had generated the “conditions of 
impossibility” for the continuation of such a rhetorical tradition. Among these were: 
“‘transparency’ and ‘neutrality’ as leading values of theoretical and practical discourse,” 
and that “imaginative discourse became anchored in ‘subjectivity.’”17 Insofar as rhetoric 
has “returned,” it has undergone a modernization wherein “transparency” and 
“neutrality” are impossible from within the confines of a subjectivity that does not “come 
from” the world, but is rather “thrown into it.”18 While Bender and Wellbery are content 
to explain rhetoric’s need to modernize as a result of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, this 
picture is somewhat incomplete insofar as it does not implicate Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason in such a modernization. Specifically, Bender and Wellbery’s claim is that it 
became impossible to square the “originating power of subjectivity with rhetorical 
doctrine.”19 The modern recuperation of rhetoric has therefore depended on destabilizing 
rhetoric as a “specialized technique of instrumental communication” and its rebirth as a 
“general condition of human experience and action” (or as Bender and Wellbery call it, 
the “rhetoricality” of the world). Gadamer makes the argument in Truth and Method, for 
example, that the basis for this “originating power” can be read as the teleological shift 
between the destruction of the physico-teleological argument for the existence of God (in 
the Critique of Pure Reason) and the “purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculties” 
(in the Critique of Judgment).
20
 In other words, Bender and Wellbery’s modernization is 
                                                 
17
 Bender and David, “Rhetoricality,” 22.  
18
 Ibid., 23-24. 
19
 Ibid., 19.  
20
 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 48.  
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not merely the result of some “originating power of subjectivity,” but also the notion that 
aesthetic judgment is dependent on nature’s being-for-us in lieu of its being-from-God.  
If one is to take seriously this account of the evolution of rhetoric—that Kantian 
thought can be said to have ushered forth the historical development that would become 
the “modernization” of rhetoric—then the focus of a theoretical account of the notion of 
“rhetoricality” would have to begin with the presuppositions that made possible the 
proliferation of rhetoric into the substance of the world. In other words, one would have 
to generate an account of the relationship between rhetoric and hermeneutics after Kant. 
Although I could write a causal history of the coming of “modern” rhetorical 
hermeneutics, in doing so I would invoke the very tradition I intend to upset.
21
  It is 
therefore more accurate to say that my intent is merely to bring together a collection of 
thoughts and thinkers which have a stake in this relationship. To the extent that such a 
survey of the hermeneutic tradition as it has manifested at what appears to be its (quite 
recent) zenith within the study of rhetoric might reveal some common trends, I will have 
happened upon what might be called the institutional zeitgeist of Bender and Wellbery’s 
“rhetoricality.” 
By the time the notion of something like a “rhetoricality” had emerged, scholars 
of rhetoric had begun to understand themselves as engaging in a project that studies a 
rhetorical Being, or as Ed Schiappa puts it, “the theoretical position that everything, or 
                                                 
21
 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier 
(London: Continuum, 2008), 25. 
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virtually everything, can be described as ‘rhetorical.’”22 In other words, rhetoric had 
become the name for the correlation between human description of the world and the 
world itself.
23
 Many scholars of rhetoric understood the rhetorical as moving beyond the 
confines of persuasive interaction and into the realm in which consciousness interacts 
with the world. For example, Hans Gadamer puts the expansion of rhetoric beyond 
oratorical persuasion in just those terms. 
Where, indeed, but to rhetoric, should the theoretical examination of interpretation turn? 
Rhetoric from oldest tradition has been the only advocate of a claim to truth that defends 
the probable, the eikos (verisimile), and that which is convincing to the ordinary reason, 
against the claim of science to accept as true only what can be demonstrated and tested! 
Convincing and persuading, without being able to prove—these are obviously as much 
the aim and measure of understanding and interpretation as they are the aim and measure 
of the art of oration and persuasion.
24
 
It became increasingly difficult to consider any type of human action or understanding 
that was not by nature rhetorical (at least in the minds of scholars of rhetoric), since, as 
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell puts it, “all rhetorical theories make the ontological assumption 
that man is, by nature, subject to and capable of persuasion.”25 Moreover, the core 
understanding of the “rhetoricality” of Being as a correlation situated rhetoric as the limit 
function of human understanding. Kenneth Burke, for example, made such a claim about 
the capacity of human thought to comprehend anything outside of language.  
Take away our books, and what little do we know about history, biography, even 
something so “down to earth” as the relative position of seas and continents? What is our 
                                                 
22
 Edward Schiappa, “Second Thoughts on the Critiques of Big Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 34, no. 
3 (2001): 260. 
23
 Broadly speaking, I (borrowing from Meillassoux) call correlationism any philosophy which attempts to 
disprove the existence of absolutes by insisting on a correlation between thought and Being. Correlationism 
can thus be defined by the phrase “thought cannot think the outside of thought, since the outside of thought 
merely appears to be outside to thought.” 
24
 Gadamer, “On the Scope and Function of Hemenuetical Reflection,” 282.    
25
 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, “The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical Theory,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 
3, no. 2 (1970): 97. 
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“reality” for today (beyond the paper-thin line of our own particular lives) but all this 
clutter of symbols about the past combined with whatever things we know mainly 
through maps, magazines, newspapers, and the like about the present?
26
 
This concept, however, can hardly be said to have originated within such a contemporary 
institutional context. As Hyde and Smith point out, the “relationship between 
hermeneutics and rhetoric, ontological in nature, evolves from the ‘basic mode’ of human 
‘understanding.’”27 The argument is thus quite simple: if the correlation between thought 
and Being is inextricable, then it makes no sense to consider as either accessible or 
valuable the world absent the finitude of human thought because human thought 
encounters the world via experience and does not access the world-in-itself.
28
 What this 
meant is that “since the ‘certain’ or ‘absolute’ side of binaries such as certain/contigent, 
absolute/probable are unavailable, we are left to dwell in the historicized land of 
contingency and probability, which means that cultural knowledge is the product of 
rhetorical activity.”29  
This “hermeneutic turn” was not a mere philosophical shift in the study of 
rhetoric, as it has largely motivated a methodological trend that has pushed rhetorical 
criticism and practice towards the analysis and composition of texts as the central figures 
of the present institutional discourse.
30
 Dilip Gaonkar’s essay on the arrival of the text 
                                                 
26
 Kenneth Burke, “The Human Actor: Definition of Man,” in Kenneth Burke on Symbols and Society, ed. 
Joseph Gusfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966): 58. 
27
 Michael Hyde and Craig Smith, “Hermeneutics and Rhetoric: A Seen but Unobserved Relationship,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 65, no. 4 (1979): 347.  
28
 Robert Scott, “On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic,” Central States Communication Journal 18, no. 1 
(1967): 9-17.  
29
 Schiappa, “Second Thoughts,” 262. 
30
 Dilip Gaonkar, “Epilogue on the Oratorical Text: The Enigma of Arrival,” in Texts in Context: Critical 
Dialogues on Significant Episodes in American Political Rhetoric, eds. Michael Leff and Fred Kauffeld 
(Davis: Hermagoras Press, 1989), 255-276. 
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within the rhetorical tradition is particularly important in understanding this realization 
insofar as one might say that Gaonkar was considering how the text had become the 
object of rhetorical studies while it was becoming the object of rhetorical studies. For 
Gaonkar, rhetoric’s turn toward the text had forced a shift away from the study of public 
address as a rhetorical act which left remainders of Truth-in-the-world and toward the 
study of public address as the rhetorical disclosure-of the world. Gaonkar makes two 
important arguments which might be called evidence of this claim. First, the necessity of 
a turn toward the text is part and parcel with a turn away from theory. 
[A] marked indifference, if not hostility, towards theory… invites a putative rhetorical 
critic to operate from within the rich and somewhat inconsistent rhetorical tradition that is 
“well over two thousand years old” rather than from within the narrow confines of a 
single theory… [T]he term “theory” evokes (even in its “rather common and benign 
uses”) negative associations: the aura of a formula, the algorithmic lust, Cicero's idle, 
talkative Greeklings, cooptation into the “knowledge industry,” and mechanical 
reproduction. In contrast, the "tradition" evokes all the right associations and even its 
inconsistency is viewed as its "glory": "What we may call the tradition of rhetoric is 
many-voiced, many-valued, and directed towards many ends." Thus, Scott recommends 
that we draw upon this richly pluralistic tradition while negotiating our critical objects 
rather than subject them to alien and reductive theories.
31
 
The impetus for a “pluralist” methodology of rhetorical criticism thus entailed a move 
away from Truth by way of rhetorical practice: to do good rhetorical criticism was to 
reject the “theoretical” notion of some sort of absolute truth or guiding principle (all the 
while assuming that those are the same thing) in the name of a “plurality” which could be 
justified on the basis of our inability to know the in-itself. Second, rhetorical criticism (in 
the form of the turn to the text) entails a knowing of the non-discursive via the discursive; 
of the context in terms of the text. As Gaonkar puts it, “[t]he pressing task, for which 
‘textual studies’ are ideally suited, is to offer an understanding of ‘contexts’ (non-
discursive formations) through a reading of texts (discursive formations) while allowing 
                                                 
31
 Ibid., 268.  
 12 
 
the text to retain its integrity as a field of action.”32 These two arguments move in lock 
step: the basis on which rhetorical practice is able to nullify the notion of a 
methodological absolute (necessitating a methodological shift toward a concern with 
world-disclosure) is itself an act of world disclosure.
33
 This destabilization of Truth in the 
name of world-disclosure, itself done on the basis of an intellectual move which mirrors 
the philosophical commitment to the correlation between thought and Being, is the 
defining feature of the departure of the rhetorical into the land of the text. If the world can 
be said to exist only in its rhetorical relation to human perception, then all rhetorical 
study must approach the composition and analysis of communication via its textual 
positions in the relation of thought to Being.  
The shift in interpretive methodology, however, presented rhetoric’s hermeneutic 
manifestation with a problem. Although the empirical existence of texts could be verified 
inter-subjectively, the meaningfulness of any given interpretive treatment was bounded 
contextually. The unfathomability of the in-itself, or the hermeneutic notion that Being-
in-the-world can only be described linguistically through the structures of experience 
(called rhetoric under this intellectual tradition), demanded that, as Steven Mailloux 
points out, “communities of interpreters neither discover nor create meaningful texts. 
Such communities are actually synonymous with the conditions in which acts of 
                                                 
32
 Ibid., 275. 
33
 This two-part movement is indicative of a shift in idealist thought which Meillassoux has, at various 
points likened to the “strong correlationism” of Heidegger’s “co-propriation” or Ereignis. Where Heidegger 
(according to Meillassoux) asserts “that neither being nor man can be posited as subsisting ‘in-
themselves,’” Gaonkar (or at least his “textual critic”) might assert the relation between text and context, 
since the non-discursive is defined via a relation to the discursive. Meillassoux, After Finitude, 12. 
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persuasion about texts take place.”34 In other words, the turn towards the text demanded 
that rhetorical critics make a simultaneous turn towards the context which surrounded 
rhetorical action in the construction and interpretation of texts (hence the prominent 
phrase “texts in context”). Much like the text, though, there was no essential context to 
which interpretive work could refer.
35
 What this hermeneutic rhetoric does, then, is not at 
all the analysis of texts, but rather the analysis of contexts, which function as the 
historical given-ness of particular correlations between texts, and as the conditions of 
possibility for meaningful interpretation (since nothing meaningful exists outside of the 
correlation). The texts themselves are merely markers of the correlation for hermeneutic 
rhetoric.  
This implicit undercurrent in rhetoric’s hermeneutic tradition resulted in the 
notion (or at the very least, the practice) that the correlation itself, rather than its mere 
correlates, is outside of the scope of rhetorical analysis. Put differently: I critique, 
therefore there is speech.
36
 This outside-ness, however, meant that hermeneutic rhetoric 
could work around its inability to establish the Truth of a given text.
37
 Many of the critics 
                                                 
34
 Steven Mailloux, “Rhetorical Hermeneutics,” Critical Inquiry 11, no. 4 (1985): 632.  
35
 Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in The Structuralist 
Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, eds. Richard Macksey and Eugenio 
Donato (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 248-249.  
36
 Although this assertion points to the “I” as the subject that escapes critique, there is substantial literature 
which has, for the better part of the last century, found new and interesting ways to critique the “subject.” 
This body of literature, however, is insufficient to furnish a critique of subjectivity in the way that I am 
trying to get at (and will have ample cause to return to later on). For now it will have to suffice to say that 
much of the literature to which I am referring critiques either the way in which subjects come into being or 
the necessity of a given subject (or both), and therefore has no bearing on the following syllogism (which I 
take to be indicative of the aforementioned statement): nothing can exist outside of its relation to thought; 
there are speech texts; there is thought. 
37
 The move toward the contingency of context produced a contingency of this or that context; this or that 
interpretive community. Despite this, a fundamentally human contextual element remained “outside” of 
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within this tradition, particularly the more contemporary among them, would therefore 
refrain from situating Truth as a merit of their analysis.
38
 Although context was not so 
concrete as to be accessible enough to analyze text with perfect accuracy, interpretative 
leg work was able to stand the test of time by way of the historical situation of the 
correlation between texts, or the contemporaneousness of potential context and the 
generation of new text in time. That solution, it seems, has been one those engaged in the 
study of rhetoric from the hermeneutic tradition seem willing to accept. Rhetoric’s 
aforementioned “limit function” within the structures of human understanding has built a 
historically evolving world that had (supposedly) already guaranteed its own institutional 
necessity by way of a double movement in interpretive practice. Hermeneutic rhetorical 
criticism would make claims that it conceded were unable to grasp the Truth of a given 
rhetorical artifact-situation, yet since Truth was beyond its grasp these interpretations 
were crystalized as meaningful via the knowledge that the rhetorical artifact-situation 
would never stop becoming. After all, there is always reason to consider and re-consider 
the text if the interpretive circle can never be completed.
39
  
Herein lays the rub between (the hermeneutic iteration of) rhetoric and its 
intellectual others: the disciplinary notion that a rhetorical subject  is outside of the scope 
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of analysis creates a static referent whereby the world might be understood rhetorically 
and only rhetorically.
40
 This means that hermeneutic rhetoric has created a rather serious 
problem for itself: the rhetorical tradition (so construed) is unable to conceive of a world 
absent rhetoric in a meaningful way (because every relation is rhetorical), and thus 
unable to think a course for its future that deviates from its present (humanist) trajectory. 
The implications of such a problem are two-fold: hermeneutic rhetoric 
anthropomorphizes the world on the basis of an outmoded humanism, thereby 
maintaining the (academic and cultural) exclusion of those modes of knowledge 
production which fall outside of its borders. The latter point—that the turn towards the 
innate “rhetoricality” of the world has proliferated rhetoric into the domains of all other 
modes intellectual progress, re-introducing “(post)modern” rhetoric to the anti-sophist 
critique of it ancient past—is thus a result of the former. 
This particular variety of humanism is of such great peculiarity precisely because 
of its role in the philosophical critique of anthropocentrism.
41
 The (hermeneutic) 
definition of rhetoric as a sort of contextual process which is itself the mode of 
experiencing the world involves either the conflation of epistemology and ontology or the 
prioritization of the former over the latter (since thinking and Being are inseparable 
correlates). In either case, the Being of the world has been considered to be correlated 
with some aspect of subjectivity. Here is where the (supposed) turn from the subject was 
to have taken place: subjectivity, since it had moved beyond the need for actual 
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(coherent) subjects of a specific type, was merely the minimal condition for the human. It 
was therefore no longer the case that only humans were capable of the experience of 
rhetoric. Instead, one merely had to experience rhetorically in order to be subject. This, 
of course, is not a critique of the subject or of anthropocentrism, but rather a projection of 
subjectivity of the human type onto the world. As Quentin Meillassoux puts it, “this 
refusal of anthropocentrism in fact only leads to an anthropomorphism that consists in the 
illusion of seeing in every reality (even inorganic reality) subjective traits the experience 
of which is in fact entirely human, merely varying in their degree (an equally human act 
of imagination).”42  
The key to unpacking this problem, at least for me, is that insofar hermeneutic 
rhetoric has committed to the notion of Being-as-correlate, it has walled itself off from 
Time altogether. It has become impossible for rhetorical inquiry (under such an 
interpretation) to contend with the notion that there are modes of inquiry which consider 
the world anterior to human thought in a way which is not at all rhetorical.
43
 The task of 
understanding such an anteriority presents rhetoric with an inescapable aporia: how did 
rhetoric come into being? Put differently, what were the minimal conditions for the 
beginning of rhetorical experience? Engaging the question requires, at a minimum, that 
one acknowledge that there would have to be a break in the ability to know the world 
rhetorically, pointing to the historical situation of consciousness. In other words, if one is 
to consider the becoming-rhetoric of rhetoric, then one must begin from the notion that 
human thought (or even thought writ large) is a historically contingent phenomenon. To 
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not begin from such a position would be to assert that the rhetorical subject is the eternal 
center of all things, since it would assert that rhetorical Being is outside of history, yet 
within (and simultaneously the conditions of possibility of) experience. This is why I say 
that the hermeneutic interpretation of rhetoric is a humanist one: even if it does not 
essentially define the human, it essentially defines Being along lines which take rhetoric 
to be the condition of possibility of human experience. In other words, hermeneutic 
rhetoric might be said to replace the old humanism with a metaphysics of the human. In 
accepting that this break merely exists, however, one has thus fundamentally called into 
question the rhetoricality of Being. These two questions are thus inseparable from one 
another: to ask how one would explain the world anterior to human subjectivity in terms 
of a subjectivity that is not given as such to humans is to ask what replaces the 
rhetoricality of Being as the ontological assumption of rhetorical critics.  
There are, of course, several ways to answer the question. My focus here, 
however, is on the treatment of such a question by way of a rhetorical hermeneutics. 
Although hermeneutic rhetoric might assert the possibility of the aforementioned break, it 
does not assert its actual existence. The hermeneutic rhetorician thus approaches the 
problem of ancestrality in the following way:
44
 since human knowledge is a 
fundamentally rhetorical experience, it is impossible to know that such a break exists, 
though it is also impossible to assert that it does not exist. In either case, the assertion 
merely appears as such to a rhetorical subject. Hermeneutic rhetoric thus refuses to assert 
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the existence of such a break, since it insists on the rhetorical nature of such an assertion. 
As Michael Leff puts it, “there is no categorical distinction between the scientific and the 
rhetorical.
45
 Rhetoric enters into every kind of discourse, even the most scientific.”46 This 
is why I say that the humanism of hermeneutic rhetoric is the condition for the 
functioning of the new sophism: it presents the scientist with a choice between the 
analysis of a world anterior to thought as if it were rhetorical and the analysis of a world 
anterior to thought by way of rhetorical experience. The latter is how hermeneutic 
rhetoricians have understood the work of scientists (and by extension the relationship 
between rhetoric and those sciences), since the former would presume that the world 
anterior to human thought resembles the world of human thought.
47
 Such a presumption, 
of course, would be premised on the capacity of thought to get outside itself, and hence 
would be antithetical to rhetorical hermeneutics. The implication, as far as rhetoric’s 
relationship to the sciences is concerned, is grave: if rhetoric is unable to consider the 
consideration of Being in absence of any rhetoricality, then rhetoric has opposed, in 
ideological fashion, thought which considers valuable the study of the world anterior to 
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thought (scientific inquiry into the nature of the prehistoric past)
48
 or thought which 
considers the possibility of a post-thinking existence (scientific inquiry which attempts to 
navigate the ecological).  
This opposition points to the institutional significance of the hermeneutic turn in 
rhetoric, and is the basis upon which rhetoric has opened itself to the critique of sophism. 
The contemporary criticism of sophistic rhetoric finds its basis in rhetoricality’s capacity 
to simultaneously efface both the legitimacy of rhetorical studies and those disciplines 
which rhetoric claims to penetrate. In other words, the new sophist is no longer content 
with insisting on the capacity of ornamental speech to craft persuasion in all other 
disciplines, and has instead insisted on the capacity of all other disciplines to be 
conducted rhetorically. In this sense, Dilip Gaonkar’s prediction of a false renaissance of 
rhetoric, itself legitimized by a turn towards “rhetoricality,” does not seem terribly 
inaccurate. 
[T]he rhetorical turn sets up an expectation that there would be a renaissance in rhetoric 
in the near future—that rhetoric would regain its lost glory as the ‘queen of the human 
sciences’ in our time, and that it would preside over other disciplines as the metascience 
of culture in the Isocratean sense. The anticipation of a rhetorical turn could, thus, revive 
and set in motion the dormant and foundational aspirations characteristic of formal, hence 
empty, disciplines like rhetoric, dialectic, and hermeneutics.
49
  
This is not altogether different from the practice undertaken by hermeneutic rhetoricians. 
The expansion of rhetoric into “rhetoricality” has resulted in the simultaneous 
proliferation of rhetorical inquiry into object domains which formerly had nothing to do 
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with rhetoric as such.
50
 There are now countless “rhetoric(s) of,” or investigations of 
particular objects as rhetorical.
51
 What we have now is thus the appearance of rhetoric ad 
infinitum: an endlessness of objects which lend themselves equally well to methods of 
“rhetorical” inquiry. The concept can therefore be said to dominate the object. Gaonkar’s 
warning of a false renaissance of the rhetorical appears, by now, to be present in great 
force.  
But what is so bad about a renaissance of the rhetorical? Put differently, why 
should rhetoricians care if the problem of ancestrality presents them with the notion that 
scientists might be doing work that is not rhetorical in nature? Even Meillassoux would 
agree that the production of such work, insofar as it becomes subject to persuasive 
discourses in the practical sense (qua its transition from theoretical to applied science), is 
subject to the rhetorical.
52
 It seems to me that the problem, at least for rhetoricians, is not 
one of anteriority, but rather one of posteriority. If rhetoric is to sustain its global 
proliferation into other modes of inquiry, it will do so by way of the fundamental 
assumptions of rhetoricality, or of hermeneutic rhetoric. To that end, the rejection of the 
problem of Being ancestral to thought also entails a rejection of Being posterior to 
thought. In other words, the marriage of hermeneutics and rhetoric results in the notion 
that rhetoric, and by extension rhetoricians, are always going to be in the world. 
Moreover, this claim necessitates that rhetoric forego its capacity to make normative 
evaluations about the existence of the world after thought: how could such a world be 
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judged if rhetoricians are always only inhabiting its predecessor? This is why I claim that 
rhetorical inquiry (so construed) has an ideological opposition to ecological concerns: 
when presented with the question “does the World matter?” rhetoric can only answer “as 
long as it’s rhetorical.” 
The “Material” Turn in Rhetoric 
The alternative to the hermeneutic model of rhetoric was to turn towards a 
“process-model” of rhetorical practice.53 Michael Calvin McGee, for example developed 
a model of rhetoric which eschewed understanding rhetoric as a product (i.e. speech text) 
in favor of a model which treats rhetoric as “’speaker/speech/audience/occasion/change’ 
operating in society through time.”54 For McGee, 
speaker/speech/audience/occasion/change are partial objects of a molecular model of 
rhetoric insofar as none can be understood outside of their place in a particular relation. 
At first glance, such a relation (or set of relations) appears to be the set of connections 
that each one of McGee’s elements bears to each of the four others. This relation, 
however, is sufficiently explicit as to obscure a secondary relation which carries far more 
serious implications. This second (implicit) relation is one which situates the molecular 
model as material only insofar as it relates to human experience.  
Though it is the only residue of rhetoric one can hold like a rock, it is wrong to think that 
this sheaf of papers, this recording of “speech,” is rhetoric in and of itself. It is surely 
“object,” and the paper and ink scratches are “material.” But the whole of rhetoric is 
“material” by measure of human experiencing of it, not by virtue of our ability to 
continue touching it after it is gone. Rhetoric is “object” because of its pragmatic 
presence, our inability safely to ignore it at the moment of its impact.
55
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For McGee, the implication for materialism is the assertion that marks themselves are 
(presumably) material objects. Rhetoric, however, is viewed as a system of immaterial 
relations or partial objects which are held together as a material object only insofar as 
there is a lived instantiation. In other words, the status of rhetoric as matter/object is 
mediated by the rhetorical experience of a given confluence of part-objects. The mode of 
confluence is thus perspectival: the way that rhetoric materializes depends on how it 
“hits” you (but it does always “hit” you). The catch, qua materialism, is that there is no 
assertion of the materiality of objects absent its relation to “us.” The confluence of 
relations remains part object or relation. It is never here nor there, but always in between. 
The status of objects, for McGee, is thus hermeneutic. Rhetoric is the embodiment of 
experience as a confluence of events. But then rhetoric really is no less material than the 
rock or the sheaf of papers in McGee’s example, since those, too, are part objects until 
the confluence of relations which constitutes our experiencing of them assembles as rock 
or sheaf. This appears, to me, to be quite a strange way of asserting a theory of rhetoric 
which is committed to materialism, since it only asserts the nature of objects as real 
material in their relation to thought.  
Materialist Rhetoric as Traversing a Governing Apparatus 
I am not the only one to have left a critical engagement with McGee’s seminal 
essay under the impression that his conception of materialism was peculiar. It is 
unsurprising that others who have had this reaction have done so on theoretical terms 
which beg examination in their own right. Ron Greene, for example, has criticized 
McGee’s conception of materialism on the basis of its complicity with a “logic of 
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representation.”56 Borrowing from Foucault (among others), Greene proposes another 
materialist rhetoric, which claims that “[t]he materiality of rhetorical practices exist in 
how they occupy a position in different institutional structures historicizing those 
institutions at the same time as those institutions put rhetoric to work for the purpose of 
governing.”57 Although I am in many ways sympathetic to this argument, it seems to me 
that Greene’s conception of a materialist rhetoric might have more in common with 
McGee’s conception of a materialist rhetoric than the former would care to afford.  
Greene claims, in response to McGee’s “fragmentation thesis” (the notion that 
there are no texts in a mass mediated world because persuasion contains neither a 
“beginning” nor an “end”), that the collapse of the text/context distinction brings with it a 
de-materialization of “institutions which rely on rhetoric in order to make judgments 
about how to govern a particular population.”58 Greene situates the importance of this 
distinction in both methodological and ontological terms. 
“[T]he problem with the implosion of the text/context distinction is that it elides an 
important implication of the Althusserian moment. McGee’s fragmentation thesis is 
guilty of an expressive causality. An expressive causality describes “the effect of the 
whole on the parts, but only by making the latter an ‘expression’ of the former, a 
phenomenon of its essence… The need to create an object of analysis displaces the 
politics of representation because the meaning of the fragment is not located in how the 
fragment represents reality or a subject or culture but in the articulation of the fragment to 
a structure of signification. As Grossberg (1992) writes: ‘articulation is the production of 
identity on top of differences, of unities out of fragments, of structures across practices. 
Articulation links this practice to that effect, this text to that meaning, this meaning to 
that reality, this experience to those politics’ (1992, p. 54). Since from the standpoint of 
articulation theory, meaning is an ‘effect’ produced by linking a fragment to a structure 
of signification, then a materialist rhetoric can escape a politics of representation by 
abandoning an expressive causality. A ‘logic of articulation’ displaces an expressive 
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causality because there is no necessary correspondence between the fragment as 
representation and the meaning of the fragment. Thus the significance of a particular 
rhetorical fragment has little to do with its epistemic, political and/or aesthetic forms of 
representation, but how it attaches itself to a structure of signification.”59 
Greene thus claims that context is not reducible to a text (or fragment). McGee, however, 
would claim (at least according to Greene) that con text is the expressive causality of a 
text. Greene therefore resituates the “attachment of a fragment to a structure of 
signification” as the object of study (although not in the same way McGee does) by 
situating texts (fragments) as articulations of governing apparatuses of this or that 
institution. As Greene puts it, “an emphasis on the logics of articulation prevents the rush 
to de-materialize the space between the text and the context.” What is interesting here is 
that it is the space between the text and context, not the context itself, which is in danger 
of being de-materialized. The quote from Grossberg is particularly telling in that regard: 
in situating articulation as the imposition of identity over an innumerable field of 
differences, Greene is here gesturing to Grossberg’s application of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s argument that difference precedes identity.60 This reference is important 
insofar as it (roughly) equates Greene’s “context” with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
“becoming.” Context, in other words, is simultaneously “real” and “immaterial.” This 
argument makes even more sense in context of Greene’s “mapping” metaphor.61 
Articulations are material insofar as they enact the assembly of the identity of a 
text/fragment given a context. But this is why Greene’s materialism is just as peculiar as 
McGee’s: articulations are not material per se, but rather are material (for Greene) insofar 
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as they are the apparatus which materializes the text/context relation. What Greene is 
proposing when he suggests transforming the “interpretive” project into a “geographical” 
one is thus a literal drawing of a map of rhetorical activity. What is peculiar, then, is the 
“outside” position of context in this process of mapping. A landscape itself would exist as 
a sort of unassailable field of differences which are sensible only in their articulation as a 
map. It is as if, in the act of drawing a map, a landscape comes to be as such in its 
“coming alive” for us. From this perspective, studying the mode of articulation is 
perfectly reasonable: of course one could pay attention to the various apparatuses which 
allow the construction of a particular map. Greene’s argument is thus a way of shifting 
interests: he wants to figure out what kind of tools were used to draw the map rather than 
figure out how the map describes the world. I call this a peculiarity, however, precisely 
because it is this “outside-ness” which was the basis for my argument that McGee’s 
materialism was itself committed to a correlationist hermeneutics. For Greene, the 
similarity is manifest in the very analysis of McGee’s materialism. As Greene puts it, “In 
an effort to account for the limitations and possibilities of a materialist rhetoric I will 
perform a close reading of a series of germinal essays beginning with McGee’s (1982) 
first attempt to outline the contours of a materialist rhetoric.”62 How else would one 
determine the apparatus used in the construction of a given articulation if not by a close 
reading of the articulation itself? What would one do, if not read the map? 
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Materialist Rhetoric as Communicative Labor 
Although it represented a conspicuous and influential (particularly in its 
application of the work of Michel Foucault) attempt to engage the problem of the 
relationship between materialism and rhetorical criticism, “Another Materialist Rhetoric” 
was not Greene’s only attempt at such a theorization.63 While that first attempt (as I have 
read it) functioned on the implicit assumption that an element of the rhetorical (context) 
was itself immaterial, Greene’s position would evolve (subsequent primarily to a turn to 
the works of Hardt and Negri) to function on the explicit assumption that the materiality 
of rhetoric could be described by the production of a subject through communicative 
labor.
64
 Communicative labor is thus also understood as the rhetorical process of 
composing this or that class formation. These two claims seem to me to be at least 
superficially incommensurate, since the latter appears to assert context (specifically class 
composition) as a sort of retroactive constitution of rhetorical practice. In other words, 
communicative labor appears to both presume and instantiate a subject. My concern is 
therefore as follows: to what extent (if any) does a theorization of communicative labor 
differ from a theorization of articulation as the traversal of a governing apparatus?
65
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Further, to what extent does the nexus between the presumption and instantiation of 
subjects in the theorization of communicative labor borrow from rhetorical hermeneutics.  
Since the problem of object domains has formed the core of my analysis to this 
point, it seems that a fitting point of departure (or rather lack thereof) is to reconsider that 
very question as regards Greene’s re-theorization of materialist rhetoric. To wit, Greene’s 
turn to communicative labor entailed a simultaneous limitation of rhetoric’s object 
domain.66 But what does such a limitation entail? 
[A] rhetorical materialism should partake in a materialist ontology that configures the 
rhetorical subject as a particular kind of being invented by and for specific apparatuses of 
production. Like a material rhetoric, rhetorical materialism understands the rhetorical as 
material; that is, it rejects a dualist ontology that separates speech from materiality. A 
materialist rhetoric does so by positing materiality as an immanent process of production 
in which rhetoric and communication are integral elements of any mode of production. 
However, we will need to abandon an understanding of rhetorical subjectivity as a 
generalized ideological effect of discursive and signifying processes. In other words, we 
need to place limits on rhetorical subjectivity as a general consequence of how language 
constitutes subjectivity. In turn, we need a more specific and concrete concept of the 
rhetorical subject. As a beginning, I suggest that a rhetorical subject refers to a subject 
that speaks and is spoken to. The history of being able to claim the ‘right’ to speak and be 
spoken to is a story of cultural value and political struggle. The question that should 
guide rhetorical scholars concerning the production of subjectivity is how concrete 
individuals come to understand themselves as subjects who communicate rhetorically. As 
such, the rhetorical subject has a specific history, whose value has been subject to intense 
problematization, beginning with Plato, and one that requires a set of institutions, 
techniques, rituals, and knowledge to inculcate in the subject the requisite ‘rhetorical 
sensitivity.’ Rhetorical subjectivity, therefore, should not be approached as any form of 
subjectivity that appears as a ‘meaning effect’ and/or psychological effect of discursive 
processes inherent to ‘texts,’ but a specific kind of subjectivity ethically, politically, 
economically, and culturally produced and valued for the work it can and cannot 
accomplish.”67 
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The interest here, at least as it pertains to the discussion about the limitation of objects of 
analysis (and therefore also the discussion about the role of context in “Another 
Materialist Rhetoric”), is about how the entirety of the quote relates to the last sentence: 
namely, what are the “ethical, political, economic, and cultural” if not context? These are, 
after all, the defining features of a “specific kind” of subjectivity. My critiques of 
McGee’s “A Materialist’s Conception of Rhetoric” and Greene’s “Another Materialist 
Rhetoric” were premised upon the implicit assumptions that each made about the non-
finite nature of context (which I earlier characterized as a hermeneutic operation which 
insists on a correlation between thought and Being). I’ll assume, for argument’s sake, that 
context is not treated as “outside” in Greene’s conception of rhetorical labor. This would 
mean that context itself is rhetorical. Such an argument cannot be held to for long, 
however, since in holding to the notion that context is both rhetorical and presumes 
rhetoric, what one has done is precisely the opposite of telling a history of the subject 
(regardless of how subjectivity is defined). Here is what I mean: if the context in which 
rhetorical subjects come to be is also rhetorical, then rhetoric must be thought as the 
condition of possibility for rhetoric. But this is neither a revelation of the historicity of the 
rhetorical subject nor an overcoming of the inside/outside duality of context. It is merely 
another way of saying what McGee and Greene have already implied: the constitution of 
a materialist rhetoric is dependent not on a historical model of rhetorical subjects, but 
rather a de-historicizing of rhetorical subjectivity as such. In other words, materialist 
rhetoric is a casualty of the same problematic as hermeneutic rhetoric: how do we think 




Materialist Rhetoric as Collective Assembly of Enunciation 
Although there are certainly a great many other articulations of materialist 
rhetoric that are worthy of analysis, I will limit my conclusion on the matter to Matthew 
May’s conception of the materiality of rhetoric as the substance of a collective assembly 
of enunciation. I do so not only because May’s thinking on the subject is fascinating in its 
own right, but because it might be seen as a bridge between my sympathies for Greene’s 
work and my own conclusions about the relationship between materialism and rhetorical 
studies. It seems a return to my earlier claims about May’s work now require greater 
detail.  
May makes two arguments which seem, to me, to break rather starkly with 
Greene’s materialist rhetoric(s). First, May claims that material is a substance, not a 
process. The latter, it seems, is more closely aligned with what May means by rhetoric. 
To return to a quote I have already borrowed from May, there is a sort of “material 
staging ground” which is enunciated as such through “the repetition of certain bodily 
practices” in order to “mark an impression.”68 Where Greene thinks the materiality of 
rhetoric as labor (and by extension rhetorical criticism via a sort of “cartography in 
reverse”), May thinks material as a set of unlimited potentials which are actualized (as 
rhetorical) via the act of enunciation. In other words, the materiality of rhetoric stands 
under the latter, lending rhetoric body and gravity as rhetoric actualizes the limitlessness 
of materiality in order to contour that body.  
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Second, May enjoins us to think the constitutive movement of history 
(specifically the trans-historical possibility of a world beyond capitalism) as held together 
by a “virtual plane of consistency,” which May claims entails “a performative enactment 
in which the potential of a new world becomes imaginable in the ashes of the old.”69 The 
difference, for May, is subtle, but important: rather than the implicit assumption that the 
context is “outside” of rhetoric, May’s move is to claim that rhetoric actualizes 
contextual substance. As May (in his analysis of Big Bill Hayward’s Cooper Union 
address) puts it, “insofar as this address is addressed to a people in the process of their 
own transformation and constitution and it affirms the surplus potential of an otherness 
within, it instantiates class struggle in a concrete act of demonstration.”70 Context (this 
surplus potential) still exists as material for May (since it is substantive), but it is illegible 
outside of its rhetorical-performative enactment, which itself draws lines of flight which 
span outward in many directions to recuperate this or that movement as constitutive. Put 
differently, May has forwarded a conception of context which neither inside nor outside 
an articulation, but which spans across articulations as a complex set of relations which 
retroactively configure their consistency.  
When I say, then, that the implicit claim in May’s explanation of the “virtual 
plane of consistency” is that the capacity of laborers to control the means of their own 
production is dependent on the occurrence of rhetorical production though which the new 
world can be typified, I am referring to the way that the claim about context implicates 
the claim about substance. May is caught between the assertion of the materiality of 
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context and the actual existence of context. In other words, since the plane of consistency 
which materially stages the constitutive movements of history (and by extension making 
possible such a “new world”) does so because it is virtual, the materiality of that plane 
cannot be said to exist outside of its instantiation as a particular assemblage of 
enunciation. In order to assert the world-making power of rhetoric, May asserts that the 
material substance of a given assemblage is not an assemblage. In other words, May’s 
materiality is not at all about objects, since this or that object is merely the assemblage of 
differences which exist materially in the virtual. But this rhetoric would not be a 
materialist one, since it asserts that the substance of the material plane of history which 
conditions the possibility of history as history is unknowable in-itself and only exists as 
such qua rhetoric.  
A Speculative Definition of Materialism 
Although philosophy appears to be entirely relevant to the institutional life of 
rhetoric, the discussion which I intend to undertake here might be called a digression 
insofar as it emerges from philosophies which do not intend to impinge on rhetorical 
practice and which insist that rhetoric, as an intellectual institution, consider itself of its 
own accord.
71
 While I do not intend to “make rhetorical” (to situate within rhetorical 
studies) the practice of such philosophies, I do intend to demonstrate the problem that 
they pose to contemporary rhetorical critics. To wit, I am concerned with the way in 
which scholars of rhetoric encounter the coming of the age of human consciousness. This 
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is why I must begin with such a digression: in order to demonstrate the difficulty that 
such an event presents, I must begin from the beginning.  
What was there (if there was anything at all) when there was no thought? If there 
was, in fact, a beginning of thinking, then how are we to describe the aporia between the 
two worlds (presuming that one accepts that such a distinction is tenable in the first 
place)—one filled with life and language, and one barren of all but extra-sensible 
substance—which are so very out of joint (particularly from within our “side” of the gulf, 
or from within the thinking world)? I should say now that it is not my intention that 
rhetoric, as either general practice or in its institutional life, take on the study of the world 
without thought. I do think, however, that the philosophical resolution to this problem has 
serious implications for how rhetoric understands what it does intend to study. I am 
therefore hesitant at this juncture to define rhetoric, as it is that definition which is 
altogether put into question, for me, by the problem which I have already presented. The 
great majority of this project will comprise explanations and criticisms of what I take to 
be rhetoric’s existing approaches to this problem (evoked by rhetoric’s quite recent 
attempts at defining its conceptual and methodological boundaries). I do not think that 
these approaches are sufficient. That appears, to me, to be the case not because of some 
lack of intellectual rigor, but rather because of difficulty in acknowledging that such a 
problem is even a problem at all.  
It is precisely this acknowledgement of a “beginning of thought” which has been 
unthinkable for contemporary philosophy because of its return to a source (to 
metaphysics, essence, existence, substance, or subject), which philosophers have spent a 
great deal of time and effort dismissing as the product of dogmatisms of a great many 
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varieties. It should be noted, however, that the end of beginnings in philosophy (better 
known as the philosophical critique of metaphysics) was contemporaneous with the de-
historicizing of human consciousness (or even of consciousness as such). This is because 
the refusal of the problem of what there was before there was thought effectively takes 
thought off of a timeline. It is therefore the coming of consciousness in time, or the 
distinction between the time of the consciousness and the time of ancestrality (or the 
world before consciousness), which here I intend to give a renewed discussion.
72
 The 
former poses no challenge, as it is without much trouble that human beings are able to 
think the time of the subject, for immediately we realize that the very act of thinking 
guarantees our place within such a time.
73
 The latter, however, poses for us a much 
greater challenge. This is because thinking the time of ancestrality asks us to think a 
world that is not correlated to human thought from within human thought. In other words, 
we must be able to think about a world that is radically uninhabited by thought—a world 
where there is no thought, yet still Being.  
The problem of ancestrality thus demands a search for the terms of what Quentin 
Meillassoux calls a new materialism. Here is why: if there is no reality that is totally 
independent of thought, then the Being of reality is ideal (since thought would be the 
substance from which objects are made); it is also the case that not all “realisms” are 
materialist insofar as not all “realisms” require that thought acquires knowledge of 
beings-in-themselves, or of beings as they are separate from thought in order to affirm 
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that Being is not derived from thought (for example, there are conceptions of realism 
which affirm the independence of Being from thought by logically deducing the limits of 
thought itself, thereby defining Being in absentia). This latter point bears further 
explanation, as it is perhaps the most crucial. If thought cannot absolutely verify the 
existence of Being’s primacy over thought, then thought is trapped affirming only itself 
as the substance of Being. It can thus be said that all realisms which are not materialist 
(so defined) lapse immediately back into idealism. If it is the inextricable correlation 
between thought and Being which defines a philosophical moment that treats the problem 
of ancestrality as unsurpassable, then it can be said that there are two formulations of 




The first of these begins with Berkeley, who can be said to have introduced 
continental philosophy to the circular nature of correlationism.
75
 For Berkeley, thought 
cannot be said to escape itself insofar as every appearance of the “outside of thought” is 
merely given to thought as outside. The “outside,” then is inextricable from the thought 
which thinks it, leading Berkeley to question the notion of an outside altogether (a 
concept which he termed “immaterialism”). All at once a slew of philosophical endeavors 
appear to fall in this camp, although the vast majority of these appear to be 
simultaneously critical of Berkeley.
76
 The tie that binds them, given their dependence on 
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such a seismic philosophical upheaval, is that each commits to the metaphysics (the 
treatment of the Ideal as the source of Being) of Berkeley’s subjective idealism despite 
the more resolutely anti-metaphysical moves within this camp (Hegel, Nietzsche, etc.).
77
 
For Meillassoux, the anti-metaphysical bent of philosophy after Berkeley responded to 
the metaphysics of the subject (base solipsism) with the metaphysics of subjectivity (Will, 
Mind, Life, etc.). The shift in question thus merely took philosophy from a particular 
(solipsist) subject to a world which bore traits that were also inherent in each individual 
subject. This has produced a philosophical trajectory that sees subjectivity everywhere 
and in everything. Although it had initially seemed that such a move would allow 
philosophy to defeat the dogmatism of metaphysics—this time by shifting from a 
determinate absolute to an absolute of quality, or of qualities inherent in beings (from the 
subject to subjectivity, or from metaphysics to speculation)—it did so on the terms of 
metaphysical dogmatism as such (for subjectivity can only exist in a certain type of 
being, namely subjects, meaning that this speculation was also of the metaphysical 
variety). Those philosophies which understand the correlation between thought and Being 
to be absolute thus confront the problem of ancestrality by denying the very existence of 
its constituent parts: there was never a time before consciousness (a time without 
subjectivity, Mind, Will, Life, etc.), but only a time where the intensity of consciousness 
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as such did not exist in the way it does now. It therefore makes no sense to pose the 
question of ancestrality to this type of philosopher, because the basic premise of the 
problem is not even thinkable.  
The second form of correlationism, first explored by Kant, attempts to disqualify 
any notion of thought’s ability to access an absolute. Despite taking the idea that thought 
cannot surpass itself to think what there is when there is no thought as its starting point, 
the Kantian rejoinder to those philosophies which consider as absolute the subject 
(absolute idealism) or subjectivity (subjectalism), does not speak of the correlation 
between thought and Being in precisely the same terms. This change in terms, however, 
is crucial in that it adds the following caveat to the circle of correlation: the 
indissolubility of the correlation between thought and Being merely gives itself as 
indissoluble to thought.
78
 It merely appears to thinking beings that there is nothing which 
is not correlated to thought. If it was the mission of philosophy after Berkeley to 
disqualify “naïve” materialism (which asserted the materiality of objects on the basis of 
observation) by way of the correlationist circle, it is the mission of philosophy after Kant 
to disqualify every absolute by way of the factual derivation of the correlationist circle. 
In affirming both the indissolubility of the circle and the factual nature of the circle as 
such, Kantian thought constitutes a double movement which simultaneously brings 
thought both closer to and farther from its access to a reality independent of thought. One 
certainly cannot think such a reality in the Kantian mode, but one can hardly be capable 
of denying it either. This is so because one cannot find any reason for the necessity of the 
correlation between thought and Being from inside the correlation itself because thinking 
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cannot produce the ontological necessity of thought. The correlationist philosopher of the 
Kantian type, then, confronts the problem of ancestrality by submitting the time of 
ancestrality to the transcendental nature of the aforementioned correlation, which forces 
ancestrality’s opacity to thought. We can never know the contents of the ancestral realm 
(or even that it exists), the argument goes, but we cannot deny the possibility of its 
existence. This answer thus relies on the teleological bracketing of inquiry to the realm of 
inter-subjectivity while grounding that teleology transcendentally.
79
 
The difference between these two varieties of correlationism is therefore the 
conclusion they draw from the inescapability of thought. The former draws, from 
thought’s inescapability, an absolute Truth: it is absolutely true (independent of thought’s 
conception as such) that Being cannot be independent of the thought which thinks it. This 
logic, however, is contradictory in the immediate sense:
80
 there cannot be an absolute 
(something which is true independent of the thought that thinks it) in a philosophical 
system which treats thought as intrinsic to Being unless that absolute is metaphysical 
because metaphysics insists on the necessity of a determinate being. The realization that 
such a contradiction exists is therefore sufficient to furnish the Kantian critique of 
metaphysics insofar as it de-absolutizes the contemporaneousness of the source of 
thought and thought itself. The latter variety of correlationism, then, debunks the 
metaphysical nature of the former by insisting on a distinction between the bodies of and 
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conditions for knowledge. In other words, Kant’s correlationism appeals to the 
transcendental in order to historicize determinate beings, thereby critiquing metaphysics 
writ large. While it is true, for Kant, that the existence of this or that determinate body is 
empirical, the knowledge of those bodies is still subject to the rules of the correlation 
between thought and Being because the correlation is the condition of possibility of 
knowledge. It is here, according to Quentin Meillassoux, that Kant’s de-absolutization of 
thought must face the problem of ancestrality directly. 
Granted, the transcendental is the condition for knowledge of bodies, but it is necessary 
to add that the body is also the condition for the taking place of the transcendental. That 
the transcendental subject has this or that body is an empirical matter, but that it has a 
body is a nonempirical condition of its taking place - the body, one could say, is the 
'retro-transcendental' condition for the subject of knowledge… [W]hat distinguishes 
transcendental idealism from speculative idealism is the fact that the former does not 
posit the existence of the transcendental subject apart from its bodily individuation - 
otherwise, it would be guilty of speculatively hypostatizing it as an ideal and absolute 
subject. Thus the subject is instantiated rather than exemplified by thinking bodies. But if 
this is so, then when we raise the question of the emergence of thinking bodies in time we 
are also raising the question of the temporality of the conditions of instantiation, and 
hence of the taking place of the transcendental as such. Objective bodies may not be a 
sufficient condition for the taking place of the transcendental, but they are certainly a 
necessary condition for it… What effectively emerged with living bodies were the 
instantiations of the subject, its character as point-of-view-on-the-world… [T]his problem 
simply cannot be thought from the transcendental viewpoint because it concerns the 
space-time in which transcendental subjects went from not-taking-place to taking-place – 
and hence concerns the space-time anterior to the spatio-temporal forms of 
representation. To think this ancestral space-time is thus to think the conditions of science 
and also to revoke the transcendental as essentially inadequate to this task.
81
 
According to Meillassoux, the thorough examination of Kant’s transcendental idealism 
reveals a hidden, non-metaphysical (i.e., speculative), absolute (and therefore the 
conditions of a new materialism).
82
 If the transcendental is instantiated in subjects and 
not exemplified by empirical bodies, then both those bodies and the subjectivity 
(correlation) they instantiate are contingent, empirical facts. It is this contingency—the 
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contingency of both the empirical bodies of subjects and the time of thinking—which 
implies an absoluteness to contingency itself. Put differently, there is no thing—either an 
empirical body or the transcendental conditions of thought—that can be apprehended by 
thought which is not contingent. It is therefore the contingency of all things which is 
absolutely true, since even if one were to argue that such an absolute only appears as such 
to thought, one would already have proven its validity (since thought itself is also subject 
to such contingency).  
Although the correlational circle becomes contingent in regard to the absolute 
possibility of its non-being, this contingency reveals its being because for something to 
be a fact, its being must be presumed. It is thus by passing through the really existing 
correlational circle that Meillassoux derives the capacity of all things to be otherwise 
than they are (that a thing could be merely given to thought indicates that it could be 
otherwise, and that thought could be merely given as such indicates that it, too, could be 
otherwise). There can be no metaphysics, no absolute entity, for Meillassoux, for 
everything exists with the capacity to be other for no reason at all.
83
 This is why such a 
break must be characterized in the materialist fashion: the absolute contingency of beings 
would exist (and with it beings themselves would exist) independent of human thought; 
moreover, this contingency is accessible by human thought because it can be described 
anhypothetically.
84
 In other words, it is thought’s capacity to think its own emergence 
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amongst the conditions which bore no resemblance to it which provides the terms of a 
speculative materialism. 
If thought is able to access (via contingency) a world that is both radically outside 
of thought and radically a-subjective, then it is unsurprising that thought attempts to 
describe this world. For Meillassoux, this description of the in-itself can only be done 
mathematically.  
When one thinks about this thing 'in itself, ' i.e. independently of its relation to me, it 
seems that none of these qualities can subsist. Remove the observer, and the world 
becomes devoid of these sonorous, visual, olfactory, etc., qualities, just as the flame 
becomes devoid of pain once the finger is removed… The thesis we are defending is 
therefore twofold: on the one hand, we acknowledge that the sensible only exists as a 
subject's relation to the world; but on the other hand, we maintain that the 
mathematizable properties of the object are exempt from the constraint of such a relation, 
and that they are effectively in the object in the way in which I conceive them, whether I 
am in relation with this object or not.
85
 
Meillassoux’s insistence that this type of knowledge must be mathematical in nature 
refers to a distinction between natural and formal languages.
86
 For Meillassoux, formal 
languages must be built around the structure of a meaningless sign. For Meillasoux, the 
term “meaningless sign” refers to a structural contingency which furnishes the capacity of 
objects to be signs. Put differently, Meillassoux would argue that objects retain the 
capacity to be signs in a fashion that is prior to any signification. He does so by an 
insistence on a material/immaterial duality in the sign. This duality, in order to fulfill the 
minimum conditions of the meaningless sign, must exist prior to the duality of 
signifier/signified. For Meillassoux, such a duality is found in the distinction between 
type and occurrence.  
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When I write the letter ‘a’ three times, I write three occurrences of a type that is itself 
unique—the letter ‘a’ in general, as instantiated in the occurrences proposed, without, 
however, being reducible to them. In other words, when you see a mark as sign, you see 
the limitlessly reproducible occurrence of an intangible sign-type. If I take the ‘a’ as 
mark, I am dealing only with the material thing. If I take it as an occurrence, I see it in the 
essentially unlimited number of its possible reproductions under the aegis of a type that, 
itself, is always identical to itself. Now, this potentially limitless reproduction of the 
occurrence obviously has nothing to do with the material of the latter…Thus, the duality 




I will use set theory (one of the same examples already explored by Meillassoux) 
to illustrate this point as regards formal languages.
88
 In set theory, mathematicians use 
variables (Greek letters, letters from the contemporary English alphabet, etc.) which are 
named but not defined in order to designate sets (collections of objects). If one were to 
define a set, one would quickly realize that its elements are themselves also sets. In other 
words, semantic content is antithetical to the basic structure of formal languages, since 
formal languages produce an infinite regression that denies semantic content as such. 
This structural resistance to definition in formal language can be referred to as the rule 
governed use of empty signs that Meillassoux calls “kenotypes.”89 This is what 
distinguishes formal languages from natural languages: natural languages may use 
kenotypes in a structural way at the morphological level, but are not required to maintain 
the emptiness of those signs at the syntactical level (in order to fill their role in everyday 
communication, natural languages are content to let meaning take residence in the 
kenotype). In other words, natural languages may make use of the empty sign as empty 
(as words that we agree are meaningless), but this is not required for the language to 
function. Formal languages, on the other hand, are kenotypical at the syntactical level. 
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One cannot maintain the grammar of any formal, and thus mathematical, language 
without the notion of a sign which stays empty (in set theory this is done via an “empty 
set”—a set of which no other set is a member). For Meillassoux, the ability of 
mathematics to discourse about the in-itself is thus achieved through the kenotype, or the 
capacity of the semantic content of the sign to be wholly other (i.e. contingent). Put 
differently, the mathematical sciences are able to describe the world as it is without 
thought because they are gramattically bound by the in-itself and the ontological 
separation of the sign, since the contingency of objects grants them the capacity to be 
correlated to thought at all, from signification, or the pragmatic meaning of this or that 




A departure from Meillassoux’s philosophical work seems necessary in order to 
demonstrate its importance to a new theory of rhetorical criticism. I will do my best to 
put the necessity of this departure in brief and pragmatic terms: those of us in the 
business of rhetorical criticism are not (and shouldn’t be) interested in this world devoid 
of semantic content on the basis of its rhetoricality. Of what use, then, is this speculative 
materialism for rhetorical critics? It seems, to me, that the study of the richness of the 
time of the subject is an endeavor which finds a great deal more similarity to scientific 
inquiry than we have to this point cared to admit. As I have already said, in formal 
languages the empty sign must remain empty, while in natural languages the empty sign 
is one that can be filled with semantic content while maintaining the syntactical integrity 
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of the language. That does not mean that signs are not kenotypical in natural language, 
but simply that they forego their ability to discuss the world of ancestrality in order to 
discuss the richness of the world of the subject. The relationship of signs to the semantic 
changes, but the structural capacity of the sign does not. What I am concerned with is 
thus the implications of the kenotype for rhetoric in the land of the semantic.  
In referring to the kenotype, one is not referring simply to the arbitrariness of the 
signifier to the signified, but instead to the capacity of anything to be sign.
91
 The 
kenotype may be anything whatsoever, but it is always also a material occurrence as sign. 
An example may help illustrate this distinction: the mark “A” has no necessary bond to 
the idea of A in general. This is the arbitrariness of the sign in Saussure, and is old news 
to most scholars of human language. The contingency of the kenotype deals, instead, with 
the notion that it is unnecessary for the mark “A” to be a given sign at all. In other words, 
a given occurrence must be understood as the token of a particular type before it is able to 
signify as that type. Moreover, non-necessity refers to the capacity of any mark 
whatsoever to fill the same function that is filled by “A” (to be a sign in the first place). 
This should, I think, beg a question which will bring me to rhetoric’s encounter with the 
kenotype: why is it important that particular marks are taken as signs by thought? To 
answer this question one must recognize a set of implications generated by Meillassoux’s 
speculative materialism.  
First, the finitude of objects-as-such by way of their absolute contingency reveals 
the non-finitude of Time, and thus the non-finitude of objects as the material 
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manifestation of time. If speculative materialism entails that particular, empirical objects 
have an absolute capacity to be other than what they are, then it also entails that those 
objects are subject to the force of an ontological (absolute) Time which provides a 
substantive setting in which contingency and the objects it inhabits can take place.
92
 The 
materiality of the world (better known as “space”), then, is merely the physical 
manifestation of contingency in Time. Insofar as Time itself is not finite, and finite 
objects are the material manifestation of Time, then there is an infinity of finite objects. 
Second, even if the non-finitude of objects were to imply the law of conservation of 
matter (which it doesn’t, since there is no reason that nothing cannot become something 
just as there is no reason that something—even the laws of nature—cannot become 
nothing), it does not place a limit on the delineation of that matter (those objects). This 
means that the becoming other of objects creates new objects.  
It is in this creation of new objects, itself entailed by the becoming other of 
objects, that the importance of speculative materialism to the study of rhetoric might 
begin to be realized. If objects become different objects when they become other, then we 
might conceptualize the creation of new objects as intrinsic to language use itself. Here is 
what I mean: every utterance entails the creation of a new mark/object. When one speaks, 
one participates in the conversion of one set of objects into another set of objects. For 
example, the various atmospheric molecules which are used in human respiration are 
converted, in the physical mark of “sound,” to a different set of molecules as a result of 
exhalation. In a less overtly physical example, when one reads aloud the words on a piece 
of paper, one is reproducing the signs of those words, but the marks themselves are 
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different. Moreover, a particular concept can achieve different meanings when it is 
carried by different signs.
93
  
In keeping with the distinction between signs and signification, the new objects 
precipitated by any utterance are not necessarily taken as signs. In natural language, 
however, the transition from utterance to sign also entails the transition from non-
meaning to meaning. This concept bears further explanation, as the transition itself is 
bivalent. The pre-signifying arbitrariness of the sign (or the capacity of the sign as 
kenotype) points to this bivalence: the transition from occurrence to signification entails 
multiple steps which are folded together in the act of interpretation. An occurrence can be 
taken as a token of a type, but the relation between a particular type and token is 
contingent. In other words, when an occurrence is taken as a type, it is taken as a given 
type.  
That the role of signs in natural language entails such a folding should point to 
two interesting phenomena. First, insofar as natural meaning occurs as a relation between 
a particular type and a particular occurrence, it foregoes the capacity to access the in-
itself (since the question “can a relation occur?” is prior to the question “can this relation 
occur?”). In other words, this is not a model of direct correspondence. This, however, has 
an incredibly important impact on how the sign ought to be understood: interpretation 
does not define what given occurrences mean or meant, but does define what similar 
occurrences are going to mean from now on (in the form of new occurrences). This is 
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because any token/occurrence which might become meaningful is subject to the 
following decision on the basis of its ontological difference from all previous occurrence: 
is this occurrence similar enough to previous occurrences as to constitute the reiteration 
of a type, or is it sufficiently different so as to warrant an entirely different type? Second, 
such a bivalence reveals a new area of interest for contemporary rhetoricians: while 
rhetoricians are often concerned with how particular meanings are arrived at, that concern 
appears, to me, to be wholly subsequent to the (kenotypical) question of whether or not 
ontologically distinct occurrences become typified (and thus meaningful) at all. Insofar 
as natural meaning occurs as a bivalence, the smoothness of that meaning (the grammar 
of natural language) is subject to the eternal potential of its own interruption. If I have 
been hesitant, to this point, to define what I mean when I say “rhetoric,” it is merely 
because of my intention to draw out the materials I feel are necessary to build such a 
definition. It is this pair of phenomena (that signification occurs within a linear 
temporality and that natural meaning is subject to the contingency of grammar), however, 
which I must now relate to the rhetorical function of language.  
This relation is not entirely new, as it borrows from the work of Paul de Man. For 
de Man, here reading Charles Peirce, the debunking of a continuous relationship between 
rhetoric and grammar begins with the linear temporality of natural meaning. 
The interpretation of the sign is not, for Peirce, a meaning but another sign; it is a 
reading, not a decodage, and this reading has, in its turn, to be interpreted into another 
sign, and so on ad infinitum. Peirce calls this process by means of which “one sign gives 
birth to another” pure rhetoric, as distinguished from pure grammar, which postulates the 
possibility of unproblematic, dyadic meaning, and pure logic, which postulates the 
possibility of the universal truth of meanings. Only if the sign engendered meaning in the 
same way that the object engenders the sign, that is, by representation, would there be no 
need to distinguish between grammar and rhetoric…  [T]he question becomes rhetorical 
not when we have, on the one hand, a literal meaning and on the other hand a figural 
meaning, but when it is impossible to decide by grammatical or other linguistic devices 
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which of the two meanings (that can be entirely incompatible) prevails. Rhetoric radically 
suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration.
94
  
It is important to note, however, that the relevance of de Man’s interpretation to a rhetoric 
of the kenotype is limited to the notion that the rhetoric bears a relation to the suspension 
and production of signs. For de Man, interpretation (what he refers to as Peirce’s “pure 
rhetoric”) is subsequent to the suspension of grammatical continuity insofar as it depends 
on the productive nature of invention. This or that “rhetorical” invention would be 
rhetorical only if it produced an inability to decide between literal and figural meaning, 
thus forcing a reading which would itself be another sign. Insofar as such an 
interpretation treats the suspension of grammatical continuity as subsequent to rhetorical 
invention, it is effectively concerned with rhetoric’s relationship to the production of 
signification, yet unconcerned with its relationship to the production of signs. Speculative 
materialism, however, might open up the relationship between rhetoric and the 
production of signs (thereby providing an alternate path to the relationship between 
rhetoric and signification). If utterance itself entails the production of new objects, then 
the rhetorical function of language which suspends the continuity of meaning is based in 
the materiality of language which suspends the continuity of signs. This suspension is 
thus not subordinate to the power of invention, but rather produces it. This difference is 
subtle, but important, since it bears upon the meaning (ironically enough) of de Man’s 
own statement. Just as signification is not endemic to the ability of the object to be taken 
as sign, it is not endemic to the new objects which are produced by utterance that 
meaning be suspended. In other words, the becoming other of the material marks of 
language does not coincide with the becoming other of the ideal continuity of language. 
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Every utterance materially suspends language, yet it belongs to the rhetorical that such a 
suspension becomes meaningful. De Man should thus be taken literally when he says that 
“rhetoric suspends logic,” since it is the power of the rhetorical to take an object that is 
materially distinct and determine its potential semantic similarity (or dissimilarity) to 
another object. Rhetoric, then, enacts an ideal relation over an already material 
suspension (although this relation is also embodied, thus forming another material 
suspension in its very enunciation). Natural meaning is thus always already undecidable, 
for it is the nature of the contingency of objects which prevents any smoothness or 
continuity of that meaning. The material suspension of language leaves no basis for the 
functioning of a “pure grammar.” What de Man referred to as the rhetorical question, 
then, might be better articulated as the rhetorical decision, since rhetoric does not 
generate the undecidable, it merely decides the undecidable.  
It is the decisional nature of rhetoric that brings me to the relevance of speculative 
materialism to rhetorical criticism. If it is the function of the rhetorical is to be conceived 
of as a decision then the practice of rhetorical criticism must bear a relationship to this 
decision. In order to develop such a relationship, however, it seems prudent to explore 
what such a decision entails. First, it means that not everything is rhetorical. That 
meaning is decisional in relation to a materiality that precedes it by generating an 
undecidable separation between objects points to the fact that rhetorical meaning can 
never encompass the entirety of the material world. The rhetorical is a massive space of 
inquiry, to be sure, but its decisional structure means that its reach is asymptotic to the 
non-finitude of material objects. In deciding the undecidable, one thus participates in the 
hypostatization of this or that piece of semantic content. Put differently, the rhetorical 
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decision is ideological at its core: it treats something contingent as if it were necessary; 
something that is finite as if it accessed the infinite. Second, the nature of the rhetorical 
decision means that rhetorical criticism, insofar as it is itself rhetorical, is also a rhetorical 
decision. Rhetorical criticism, since it produces rhetoric and is the product of rhetorical 
activity, would then also appear be an ideological practice. Moreover, such a conception 
of rhetoric (and of the integral place of ideology in rhetorical activity) seems to imply a 
lack of distinction between rhetoric and rhetorical criticism.  
What, then, is the difference between rhetorical criticism (and rhetorical critics by 
extension) and the everydayness of rhetorical activity? The answer to this question 
appears, at least to me, to begin by recognizing, rather than obviating or denying, that 
rhetorical criticism begins from the same place as the daily practice of rhetoric: the 
rhetorical decision itself. If the rhetorical decision is the common element of these two 
rhetorical practices, then the difference might be found in the way that each orients itself 
to that decision. Specifically, there are two different ways to approach the way that 
rhetorical decisions imply semantic finitude. This is because there are not one, but many 
different signs that are produced when one sign creates another. One interprets an 
occurrence as type, and in the process of doing so begs a rhetorical decision about 
whether or not the interpretation is sign. The interpretation, then, is the utterance which is 
the potential sign/remainder. To borrow from de Man’s reading of Peirce, the 
interpretation of each sign is itself a sign. This is true even if the rhetorical decision is 
conceived of as ideal, since it is instantiated in its performance by a subject. Just as each 
rhetorical decision has the capacity to be made, it also has the capacity to be made other 
(or not made at all). The everyday practice of rhetoric thus entails a rhetorical decision 
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that does not treat itself as a sign. It is only concerned with the first sign, since the 
rhetorical decision is not an object to be taken as sign until it is decided. Rhetorical 
criticism, by contrast, is concerned with the second sign, and thus entails a rhetorical 
decision which decides another rhetorical decision. Because rhetorical criticism decides 
to take a decision as sign, it closes in on the ideology of everyday rhetorical practice, 
even while it is itself ideological. Put differently, rhetorical criticism demystifies the 
ideological meaning made by a given rhetorical decision by deciding that such a decision 
is itself contingent. Rhetorical criticism is thus characterized by a meta-decision which 
depends on the kenotype in both cancellation and production of ideology.   
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PART TWO: ON HUMAN MICROPHONES AND THE RHETORICAL SELF-
ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONS 
 
It seems worth mentioning, at the very least, that Slavoj Zizek’s speech to the 
Occupy Wall Street movement on October 9, 2011 was delivered to a relatively small 
audience (albeit one that grew in number and encompassed greater physical space 
throughout the course of the speech). It was not widely broadcast. Video recordings of 
the speech show cameras from multiple major news networks (CNN, MSNBC, Fox 
News, etc.) filming Zizek. A Fox News camera man, for example, can be seen filming 
Zizek from within an arm’s reach. The footage never aired on that network. Searching 
“Zizek” on Fox News’ website produces no results. This is not just a singular case, but 
rather the norm regarding news coverage of the speech. The availability of the text itself 
comes only from low quality video shot by people in the audience.
95
 Many of these 
videos have been posted to YouTube. When combined, they have fewer than 100,000 
views by a wide margin. There are people like me who are responsible for hundreds of 
individual views. Very few people have experienced this speech.  
What strikes me as peculiar, however, is the sheer number of times this speech 
(and certainly countless others during Occupy’s brief existence) was delivered. Many of 
those speaking to the crowds at Occupy Wall Street delivered their speeches into “human 
microphones” (each time the “original” speaker completed a sentence or a phrase, the 
audience would echo his or her words so those who were not close enough to hear the 
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original utterance could hear a repetition of the words). It is this practice, then, that 
resulted in Zizek’s speech (alongside many others) being delivered not once, but rather 
many hundreds of times (by many hundreds of speakers). This speech (or perhaps “these 
speeches”) might therefore constitute a very unique rhetorical artifact, for it is certainly 
not commonplace for any public address to be repeated verbatim quite so many times in 
such a limited spatial and temporal setting (or even at all). It would therefore be woefully 
insufficient to see this speech and think to analyze only Zizek’s words, as such an 
analysis would gloss over the element that makes these rhetorical artifacts so unique: they 
are repeated regardless of whether or not the “original” speech is particularly effective. 
Although there is an emerging literature on the subject, it seems to me that far too little 
has been said about the peculiarity of the so-called “human microphone”96 and of the 
peculiarity of its relation to Zizek’s utterance, and so I will here endeavor to explore these 
in greater detail. Specifically, I will engage the phenomenon of this human microphone 
from three different perspectives, each of which represents my own effort at replicating a 
different theoretical commitment at the heart of what might be called rhetorical criticism. 
Of these, two are relatively well established practices taken up by contemporary 
rhetorical critics. The third, then, is my own attempt at exploring what a different 
theoretical commitment might bring to a rhetorical analysis of the human microphone.  
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I may have gotten ahead of myself, however, and the following point bears 
repeating: the point of contention with which I am concerned is the rhetorical decision to 
refer to the utterances in question as either a speech or speeches. To that end, my 
examination must concern itself primarily with the way in which one might conduct this 
rhetorical criticism by working through the aforementioned problem. It also seems to me 
that such a problem might not provide a clear resolution, so perhaps I should offer a 
different, yet closely related reinterpretation. To the extent that this rhetorical criticism 
might have an object of analysis—I’ll call it a “text,” for simplicity’s sake—that object 
remains unclear by virtue of the role of the human microphone, which itself begs the 
question of how unified this “text” might be. It might then be worth asking the following 
question: is the human microphone a part of the “text” which includes Zizek’s own 
utterance? If so, I am dealing with a speech. If not, I am dealing with speeches. Assuming 
one were to answer this question in the affirmative, there appear to be a series of 
questions that ought to immediately follow. Namely, why answer this question in the 
affirmative? What type of conclusions might this analysis produce? How (if at all) does 
the affirmative resolution of this problem come to bear on the conclusions of its analysis?  
A Hermeneutic Approach 
It seems to me that there are two lines of reasoning which might answer this 
question in the affirmative. The first of these does so by (roughly) the following logic: 
insofar as I might be concerned with the explication of a particular meaning that could (or 
perhaps “ought to”) be gleaned by treating the utterances themselves as expressions that 
are already prefigured as a particular language, there appears to be little distinction 
between these utterances as expressed by Zizek and as expressed by the crowd. In other 
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words, the human microphone is not saying other words. It is merely a kind of 
repetition/amplification device, albeit one that is unique for reasons that I shall explore in 
short order. The task of a rhetorical critic, in this case, is thus as follows: I must 
determine what the text of this speech means, given the external (not a part of the text 
proper) information available to me (for the sake of simplicity, I’ll call this “external” 
information “context”).97 Already it would seem that I have made a leap which bears 
further examination, since it does not appear (at least upon first glance) to be the case that 
the utterances of the human microphone would necessarily be separate from those of 
Zizek. I do not think, however, that it is necessary (at this point) to provoke any looming 
discussion of the ontological nature of the text. As far as I am concerned (so long as I am 
following this particular line of logic), these utterances might be considered one text so 
long as I am able to unify their sum total as either one speaker or speech event. Here I can 
do that by insisting on a lack of difference between Zizek’s speech and its echo through 
the microphone. What must be examined are thus the ways in which meaning can be 
made by an analysis of these particular “speakers” (namely Zizek and the human 
microphone) and their interaction as a sort of “call and response” exercise (certainly other 
contexts can be examined, but these are sufficient for my purposes here). This is because 
the meaningful difference between the utterances in question is in actuality a series of 
relations between Zizek and the microphone (since, of course, the microphone merely 
repeats and amplifies).  
                                                 
97
 Here context is meant as a sort of pool of reference from which meaning is drawn. In a more specific 
sense I am trying to get at the notion that context might refer to “other texts and.” The “and” is therefore 
the operative word here. What the contextual move does, then, is places two texts in relation to each other. 
In other words, context is meant as a “weaving” of texts (from “contextus” or “contextere” in Latin and 
Middle English, respectively).  
 55 
 
What, then, might I deduce from the fact that the human microphone functions as 
a “call and response” that is contextually bound to Zizek and this audience which 
constitutes the microphone itself? It seems prudent, if such an investigation is to be 
productive, that I examine its constituent parts. Since it is only by placing the text in 
context that meaning might be made, I will begin with the two elements of what I have 
been calling the context: Zizek and the audience. I should note as I begin, however, that 
while an exhaustive description of each of these might be tremendously productive 
(indeed, it could lead to very many interpretations of this speech), it is overly sufficient 
for the purpose of the point I am trying to make. I will therefore limit my description to 
several differences between Zizek and the audience, as it may make my focus on a 
particular element of the text more salient.  
Although the lack of diversity and the seemingly high—at least for a protest 
which was organized to criticize income inequality (although this distinction seems 
largely arbitrary to me)—employment rates and levels of affluence would later become 
criticisms levied against Occupy, it should be noted that the vast majority of Occupy 
attendees were functionally unemployed during their attendance. Certainly there were 
some members of the audience who were working and earning income during the protest, 
but the vast majority were not, having forsaken their jobs (if they had them) for the 
purposes of attending. Zizek, however, is not lacking for employment (he even attended 
several promotional book signings in the days immediately surrounding this address). 
Indeed, he is one of the most prolific published authors of his generation, writing several 
dozen books in several different languages, he is frequently a featured columnist in 
several major newspapers, and he routinely makes public speaking appearances around 
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the world (all this in addition to several academic appointments). Moreover, he is quite 
literally working during his speech at Occupy, as he is participating in his role as a public 
intellectual.
98
 Economically speaking, he has very little in common (qua employment or 
even production) with the constituents of his microphone at the time of his speech. 
Moreover, this lack of commonality is indicative of a difference in the approach to 
performing revolutionary politics. Although the political allegiance is ostensibly the 
same here (i.e. protest as a type of revolutionary praxis), it belies the discrepancy in 
approaching labor as integral to that politics.  
In addition to a very tangible difference in labor, much of Zizek’s speech assumes 
a dramatic difference in the social atmospheres from which he and the audience emerge. 
Although Zizek would bind the Occupy movement together with social unrest in other 
parts of the world (in Greece, Tunisia, and Egypt, for example) under the banner of anti-
capitalism, he goes out of his way to isolate the unique nature of the situation in the 
United States. While other countries must rely on political and cultural oppression as a 
means of silencing alternatives to capitalism (Chinese censorship of film is perhaps the 
most poignant example in the speech), the sociopolitical climate in the United States is 
well beyond such crude methods. Indeed, at Occupy “the ruling history has even 
oppressed our capacity to dream.” Not only does the audience enter the speech without 
having a particular alternative to capitalism, it does not even know that there are 
alternatives. Zizek, however, does his best to distance himself from this particular type of 
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oppression. Certainly he is distanced by the separation between his home country 
(Slovenia) and the United States (a separation which is both geographical and 
ideological). He goes out of his way, however, to demonstrate that, in a global climate of 
contemporary capitalism, no place is really distanced, since “[I]f Communism means a 
system which collapsed in 1990… those Communists are the most efficient, ruthless 
Capitalists.” Communism is, instead of a particular political system which opposed 
capitalism in a particular historical situation, a way of orienting one’s self to “the 
Commons.” Moreover, some of the old “Communists” (now that this term itself has been 
called into question) remember what it was like to bear this particular orientation, at least 
insofar as the consideration of alternatives might be concerned. They even had jokes 
about it. In fact, Zizek makes a point to tell one of them in order to demonstrate one of 
his points. Although the joke itself may seem poignant, I will not concern myself with its 
actual content, since it also operates at a level that is far more interesting in regards to this 
line of thought: Zizek remembers these times, and the audience (at least given this 
construction) does not. Zizek thus possesses a particular cultural knowledge that exists 
outside the space or time of this particular audience. It is therefore only Zizek who here 
has access to the particular “where” or “when” that is necessary to even understand that 
alternatives to capitalism are available.  
It is worth highlighting these discrepancies because they might be problematized 
by a particular pattern in this speech: if the subject of the speech is how one might orient 
one’s self to the Commons, then Zizek has little in common with the audience in practice 
(qua labor politics) or in experience and theory (i.e. his interpretation of Communism as a 
result of his particular social location), yet he almost always uses the first person plural in 
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situations where he might refer to himself in the first person singular or the audience in 
the third person plural. For example, Zizek begins the speech by saying, “We are called 
losers, but the true losers are down there on Wall Street” instead of saying “you are called 
losers…” It is the function of this use of the first person plural which I am here concerned 
with exploring in greater detail. These differences set the stage for a sort of ethos proof, 
or rather several ethos proofs. Of these, the discrepancy in the labor performed in this 
particular protest is bridged by a type of eunoia. The references to (re)articulations of 
Communism are thus a tool by which Zizek might connect himself to the audience via a 
general good will towards revolutionary praxis. The discrepancy in social location, at 
least in this instance, lends itself as a type of phronesis. Zizek’s unique temporal, spatial, 
and (above all) social separation from the audience might give him a kind of practical 
wisdom insofar as the care of the Commons (or even Communism) is concerned. Insofar 
as the general character of the speaker is one type of (or part of a type of) conceptual 
framework for making the text intelligible, it relies on drawing a contextual connection 
between constituent elements of the text which are themselves presupposed to be separate 
in their very identification. I might make sense of the speech if I begin with assumptions 
that are rooted in an analysis of Zizek’s general character, but in doing so I have accepted 
a primordial distinction between the speakers of each of these utterances (that of Zizek 
and that of the human microphone). In other words, it is difficult to articulate a coherent 
ethos proof if this is one single text. Even though I might consider the sum total of these 
utterances as a single text, I cannot describe the speaker of that text as a singular entity. 
He is speaking to them. What is interesting here is that the use of the first person plural 
interrupts the basic assumption of this train of thought: that Zizek and the audience could 
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be described as so radically different is erased by the first person plural insofar as it 
(re)articulates Zizek into the audience. They are all referring to themselves collectively, as 
a particular agent (albeit one with many voices). This articulation, then, appears to 
change the speech entirely. He is no longer speaking to them. They are speaking together 
as one. I might ask myself, at this juncture and as a direct result of this change: what am I 
to do with all of these differences? How am I to maintain the unity of this text along lines 
which assert the uniformity of utterance when the mode of my interpretation demands 
that such uniformity not exist? 
Perhaps I might explore this tension by returning to the pattern of call and 
response, as it seems integral to the sort of centralization that I take to be occurring here. 
Here I use the word centralization in a very particular sense: I mean it as a type of 
arrangement which prefigures the location of all of the constituent elements of the text in 
relation to a particular element of the text. The latter, in this case, would be Zizek (and, 
of course, his utterance). The integral location of the call and response in this 
centralization is therefore defined by the fact that the microphone echoes Zizek instead of 
speaking with him. The audience, although it repeats the words that Zizek says, does, in 
fact, say other things. This is because the arrangement around Zizek is a type of 
melody,
99
 much like one might create a melody (albeit a monotonous one) by repeating a 
particular musical note. What I mean by this is that the experience of hearing one note (or 
here, one utterance) is modified by the experience of hearing another note (regardless of 
whether or not they are differential) prior to it. The chorus of a given song sounds 
different the second time around. This means that although the human microphone says 
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the same words as Zizek, they cannot be experienced in the same way because of the 
subjective experience of the passing of time. Zizek’s “unification” with the audience by 
way of the first person plural (making one “speaker” with many voices) is simultaneously 
dissembled by the very structure of the human microphone.  
It is here that I have run up against the limit of the logic which treats these 
utterances as one text (or one speech). The moment I treat this like one particular text, all 
of the contexts through which I would encounter it come flooding back to tear it apart. 
The only way I can make this into a unified text is by assembling a dividing line which 
presupposes the lack of unity in the first place. When I started with this multitude of 
utterances as one text, I was driven to acknowledge, by way of the very reason that 
analyzing this text might have been “unique” in the first place, that these are very 
different speakers, each of which is producing a text which calls up different contexts 
upon its encounter (which is why Zizek can be considered to have “ethos” here). In order 
to (re)unify the text along the lines of the actual discourse, I had to erase some of those 
differences. Even the unity of that discourse, however, is complicated by the fact that 
these speakers don’t speak in unison. One could surely re-unify the text again, and along 
different lines, but that, too, would be dissolved in some larger contextual appeal.  
A Materialist Approach 
I’ll turn now to the second route, since there are multiple ways to answer my 
problem—the problem of whether or not to treat this moment as a single text—in the 
affirmative. This second line of thinking follows a slightly different logic. I might 
consider these utterances as a single text insofar as they are a series of “material” 
 61 
 
occurrences which are unified by their inseparability from a historical context which 
retroactively prefigures the conditions of their possible construction as such. I might 
therefore say that the goal of a rhetorical criticism of this type is to determine, by 
working backwards from the text itself, what types of contexts act on these material 
utterances in order to make them the way that they are. If the criticism of the previous 
type endeavored to discover what context could reveal about the text, this second 
criticism will aim at describing what the text could reveal about the context which 
envelops it. In undertaking a more “materialist” criticism of this address, I might be 
concerned with the ways in which the actual articulation of the text functions as a nexus 
point between the words themselves and the “ethical, political, cultural, and economic” 
milieu in which they are situated.  
I might begin this approach by pointing out something that is somewhat obvious, 
yet still quite important: this speech is made interesting by the audience, and the people 
who make up that audience (or at the very least the quality that makes them so interesting 
as an audience, i.e. that they/it are/is also a microphone) might have been there 
regardless of whether or not this speech took place. Certainly the people in the crowd 
might not exist in the same way had they not experienced the speech as members of the 
audience/microphone, but their bodies would still have been at Occupy (if not in those 
same places). Even in the face of restrictions on the use of megaphones at Occupy Wall 
Street,
100
 it would not have been hard for Zizek to talk publicly about Occupy Wall Street 
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without the use of the human microphone,
101
 given the wide variety of dissemination 
tools available to him (the prominence of social media at Occupy Wall Street and Zizek’s 
easy access major written publications are just a few possibilities).
102
 The people in this 
audience were not there merely to hear Zizek speak. They were also there to speak 
themselves. It is therefore the set of bodies that are involved, and specifically their 
relations to other bodies (Zizek, city ordinances, etc.), that establishes the uniqueness of 
this particular discourse. 
I should also mention, before I conduct any further analysis of the way the bodies 
of the human microphone function here, that, although those bodies are the elements that 
make this situation so interesting to me, they are not the only material concerns to be 
discussed as regards this text. Specifically, it seems worthwhile to make some mention of 
the fact that it was Slavoj Zizek that dictated this particular text. Why, then, is Zizek 
himself important? It seems, to me, that Zizek’s literal presence at Occupy Wall Street 
bears examination. I do not mean to analyze this or that particular reason for his 
presence, but instead only intend to point out (as I did above in another context) that 
Zizek was doing labor there. To the extent that the portion of the text that can be 
attributed to Zizek might be attributed to him as product, one must account for the body 
of intellectual work which is tied to his name. Certainly one of the differences between 
Zizek and the audience is a difference in the way the oratorical production in question is 
categorized, which in turn reveals the means of this very categorization as one of the 
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contextual relations with which I am concerned. In other words, the situation of this 
speech within a sort of “canon” (particularly given the extension of this speech into 
multiple pieces of Zizek’s writing) indicates a performative relation between a set of 
ideas about politics and a set of bodies politic. The question of labor, then, is a question 
which concerns the assembly of a particular audience-as-such. This is not to say that it 
was Zizek’s “intent” to construct an audience which resembled “his” conception of the 
proletariat, but instead to claim that the thing that we call “Zizek’s” conception of such a 
proletariat is the product of a relation between him and a set of bodies which he 
rhetorically assembles as audience.
103
  
If the examination of this performance is to stay centered on the discussion of 
Zizek’s embodiment of it, then it should be mentioned that my use of the term “dictate” 
should be read in two different ways: as the literal speaking of words and as the direction 
of a particular tempo or rhythm. The latter, to this point, has been left undiscussed. 
Insofar as Zizek dictates the direction of the text (given the way the microphone itself 
functions), he does so by determining in advance what the microphone will say… 
provided he says the “right” thing. The microphone itself has agency here (at least in a 
different way than a traditional microphone might), and can “mic check” Zizek if it so 
chooses.
104
 Moreover, it is difficult to say that all of the same themes which are present in 
the Zizekian “canon” (or any other canon in which this speech could be situated) are 
present in this particular speech.  Some things are missing. The text itself thus reveals a 
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set of unrealized potentials which are limited by the act of performance as such, since the 
performance only exists as relation between a particular set of bodies. The fact that the 
text (or at least part of it) is dictated (spoken) by Zizek calls forth a contextual relation 
which is itself shaped by the fact that the text is dictated (inaugurated) by Zizek as a 
relation to the microphone.  
It is this second dictation which begs my return to an examination of the bodies 
which constitute the microphone itself, since its importance presumes that the audience 
itself is constituted in a way which includes a rough, but tangible set of political goals. In 
other words, the reason that Zizek might have gotten “mic checked” if he had lapsed into 
a lecture about psychoanalysis has something to do with the human microphone. How is 
one to go about discovering what this something might be? The only instance of such a 
“mic check” during the speech had more to do with Zizek’s delivery than with some sort 
of political disagreement (in fact, it was because the people in the microphone couldn’t 
understand what he was saying). Perhaps another way of asking this question is to ask the 
same question that I have already asked about Zizek: what type of labor is going on here? 
For Zizek, the labor is the assembly of an audience as proletarian multitude. If the 
microphone were to work that way, though, it would have to speak with him. Since it 
didn’t, there is a remainder. That remainder is Zizek, and he exists as remainder because 
he does not speak with the audience. He actively introduces pauses into his speech so that 
he does not speak with them. The labor operation of the microphone is thus a very 
peculiar one for the orator who attempts to assemble the microphone as a particular 
audience: it will not go as fast as the speaker needs it to. Moreover, this type of labor is 
antithetical to Zizek’s, as it is performed as a cancellation of his. This means that the 
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crowd performs, in its function as the human microphone, a shift in labor relations which 
is itself dependent on the organization of bodies as such. By being present as 
microphone, one is rearticulating the terms of his/her labor power in a specific way: I will 
not work that fast.  
How, then, is the direction of this shift to be understood? The answer, given the 
social milieu in which Occupy is situated, might appear rather self-explanatory: this is the 
“99%” performatively taking control of their labor, which was itself previously in the 
hands of the “1%.” This is why Zizek cannot talk about Lacan or Hegel for twenty 
minutes: the slowdown which instantiated a shift in the labor relation between Zizek and 
the microphone also entailed a shift in the mode of production. In changing the 
coordinates of the production process itself, the dictation of the speech is re-figured 
within the confines generated by the microphone and functions as follows: “instead of 
talking about what Zizek might want to talk about, we’re going to talk about what we 
want to talk about.” Such an interpretation implies, or at least attempts to imply a shift in 
agency. The point, however, is that this social milieu (the “what” in “what we want to 
talk about”) is a given rather than a presumption. In other words, this context does not 
exist over and above the text as some sort of historical inevitability. It is instead given as 
such, or appears to a critic via its instantiation as a related text. I can only come to the 
conclusion that understands this performative reorganization of labor as effectively 
proletarian (i.e. by placing this interaction in a wage-earner/boss relationship/opposition) 
if I refer to a set of texts which are themselves both separate and prior (the employment 
conditions of the individual bodies of the audience, the contrast between the “99%” and 
the “1%,” the emergence #Occupy in social media, etc.) from what I had taken to be the 
 66 
 
text in the first place.
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 In other words, a “materialist” approach, in its methodological 
unification of the text, implicitly decides the way several different elements ought to be 
related. Moreover, I am only able to understand this set of relations as oppositional given 
the insistence on the unity of the text. If this is a speech which merely integrates a series 
of pauses and repetitions into its construction, then the microphone is a technology which 
fundamentally cancels the notion of an orator communist because it retroactively 
identifies the orator as boss.  
Here, again, I have run up against the limit of a logic of rhetorical criticism which 
would treat these texts as one text. In appealing to a unified text as a means of 
discovering context, what one discovers is, in fact, not context (since it is not properly 
external to the text itself), but rather a multiplicity of text. The unification of the variant 
bodies here calls forth a new set of bodies (Zizekian literature) which themselves become 
inseparable from the critical performance. This inseparability, itself merely a 
“contextual” relation, calls forth yet another “text” (the empirical passage of time or the 
“pause” in speech). The relation between these, too, calls forth a multiplicity of objects of 
analysis (potential or unrealized “mic checks”), which in turn call forth even more objects 
of analysis (slogans and stories and social lives). The sum total of these points to a 
remainder, or a fundamental disunity of the text: the very logic of the unity of the text 
authorizes an absolute multiplicity of speakers and speech texts. It is thus not the 
absoluteness of the contextual relation which produces the plurality of the text. It is 
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instead the plurality of objects which cannot be held together by relation in any absolute 
way. This is not One text until I take it that way.   
A Speculative Materialist Approach 
If I am unable to deal with this problem by undertaking a rhetorical criticism 
which understands the text as unified, then perhaps a new approach is required. 
Moreover, it seems this new approach will not be able to begin with the assumption that 
this is one text. I will begin there, then, since this assumption appears to be the critical 
difference between a rhetorical criticism of this type and its predecessors. If I am to 
assume that these are plural texts, I might do so by inverting the infinitive in the 
text/context relation that is assumed in the previous rhetorical criticisms. In the previous 
approaches context is presumed as infinite, albeit in two different ways. In the former 
context is understood as a process, not an object. It is merely a mechanism for connecting 
various texts. It might be said that the text might exist absent a context, but it can only be 
known via context, which inverts the previous statement. It is in the epistemic block 
formed by the process of context that one cannot say that there is not a text. Since one 
cannot escape this block, we must presume that context is infinite (although it might be 
better described as transcendental). In the latter context is understood as that which both 
precedes and assembles the text. In other words, it is a substance. Here the text cannot 
exist apart from the context, since the context is the sum total of the virtual occurrences 
of text. Text is thus merely an empirical assemblage of context, though context can never 
be reduced to the text (by way of the partition between the virtual and the empirical). 
Context, as the substantive relation between these (the virtual and the empirical) is thus 
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understood to be infinite here as well (although it might be better described as vital).
106
 
The inversion, then, is as follows: the text is (or rather “the texts are”) infinite. Context 
can only be said to exist in the form of a particular occurrence or embodied subject. In the 
case of my first criticism, it might be true that context is a process, but it is one that is 
inseparable from the object which carries it out (the critic). Likewise with the second 
criticism: only texts are substantive, while context is an empirical quality of this or that 
text. It can thus be said (and in the case of rhetorical criticism, begun from) that there 
exists a plurality (infinity) of texts, which are only connected as embodied, empirical 
relations.  
But what does this have to do with rhetorical criticism? Better yet, how is this 
expressed in the form of a rhetorical criticism? It appears, to me, that the concern here is 
with decision. By decision I merely mean (in this context) that one has the option to take 
the utterances of the human microphone as a series of signs in their own right (and not 
merely continuations of the utterances made by Zizek). Hence the resolution of my 
problem along negative lines: these are speeches. Specifically, they are speeches that can 
be taken together (as one) or apart (as many). This last type of rhetorical criticism, then, 
is concerned with the lines along which the text (as an object of study) is delineated.  
If I begin with the assumption that these are different texts, then I should not take 
for granted that the human microphone itself is unified. After all, it is made up of a 
heterogeneous group of bodies, each of which would constitute a singular object (without 
making mention of the historical and cultural specificity of each) and would produce a 
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different utterance/object/text. My point is not to analyze each of these in its specificity, 
but merely to identify (once again) the remarkable nature of the phenomenon at work 
here: all of these different texts happen to be altogether quite similar. They all happen to 
say the same set of words. They all happen to respond to Zizek. They could have been 
otherwise. Zizek could have been “mic checked” or ignored or not “mic’d” at all. There 
is nothing necessary about the empirical similarities between any of these texts. Zizek 
does not dictate the text produced by the microphone. He opens up new relational 
possibilities. There are a lot of similarities. It is easy to understand this as one large text. 
I will return now, if only briefly, to a point I have made previously: the human experience 
of these texts is melodic. One comes after the other (or rather many come after the first). 
It is thus possible, despite the similarity of the texts, to understand them as differential. 
One can understand each repetition here as a new sign even though the utterances are 
similar. Once Zizek says “we are the awakening from a dream that is turning into a 
nightmare,” it becomes possible to understand the audience as meaning something 
altogether different by the same phrase, since their utterance is modified by his, since 
their utterance is ontologically distinct.  
The decision in question is thus as follows: in encountering these speeches, do I 
understand the microphone to mean the same thing Zizek means when they produce 
similar utterances? Certainly I could answer this question in the affirmative, but in doing 
so I would reduce the multiplicity of these texts to only one text, since I would do so by 
relying on a context which exists separately from its instantiation as individual 
texts/bodies/experiences. This seems less than tenable, if not openly and violently 
ideological. I’ll assume a negative resolution to this question, then. What types of 
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conclusions might such a resolution produce? There are several factors at work here, 
namely: the contingency of the microphone as the source of a multiplicity of text, the 
iterative similarity (reiteration) of that multiplicity, and the repetitive sequence of the 
texts in time. Before I go further, however, I’ll return to another point I’ve already made: 
there is some type of (communicative) labor going on here. Something is (texts are) 
produced. Moreover, this production appears to be of at least two categories when placed 
in relation to the repetitive sequence at work here: the text as produced by Zizek and the 
texts as produced by everyone else involved. This division of labor is further modified in 
light of the fact that there are similarities between the texts (reiteration), despite the 
contingency of the speaker/microphone relationship. In other words, the fact that Zizek 
was reiterated indicates that he said what the microphone would permit him to say. The 
human microphone is thus a particular type of revolutionary technology insofar as it 
shifts the control over the means of communicative production to the masses. 
Furthermore, the shift in the means of production retroactively aligns (via reiteration) the 
division of labor that is opened by repetition. There is a sort of universality in the 
connection that is formed between the two, since the microphone rearticulates Zizek’s 
communicative labor in terms of its own control over the means of production. It says the 
same words, but it says them on the terms of its own agency. The problems posed by the 
human microphone are thus not merely starting points for rethinking rhetorical criticism, 
but rather the conditions under which rhetorical criticism can think these texts as a 




At first glance, the conclusions of this last analysis do not appear to be altogether 
different from those of the previous two. It seems to me, however, that this is more a 
function of the method by which those other readings might produce insight. Specifically, 
the production of insight in each of the first two rhetorical criticisms was premised on the 
breakdown of the unity of the text. The point of contention thus regards the insight gained 
from beginning a rhetorical criticism with a plurality of texts rather than encountering 
that plurality as a byproduct of the conclusions of the criticism itself. This distinction is 
far from trivial, since it accounts for the power of human microphone technology. Text is 
always already a multiplicity, but is not always experienced as such (via the melodic 
structure of experience). The technological power of the human microphone is thus not of 
assembly, but rather of disassembly. This is why I say the human microphone presents 
the rhetorical critic with a decision: the differences between these speakers/speeches/texts 
are upon the critic in the form of the human microphone, and they can either be embraced 
or ignored. The problem with the latter (and by extension any type of rhetorical criticism 
which would approach the human microphone as one text) is that it elides these 
differences in a way which insists upon a bourgeoisie ideology by treating the proletariat 
as ultimately subservient to the (ostensibly inevitable) willing transfer of labor power 
from the hands of bosses to the hands of the working class.  
In the case of my first criticism this phenomenon is the result of understanding 
language as a pre-existing collection of ideal types. Zizek’s position affords him the 
luxury of telling the microphone how a revolutionary should be (which is like him, given 
the first person plural). The implications, given the differences in labor power and social 
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location, are rather clear: Zizek’s rhetorical move says “this is what is best for you,” and 
the microphone both amplifies and submits. I can read this as one text being amplified 
(qua ideal types), but in doing so I am wedded to either the idea that any of the 
transformative potential of the microphone depends on the authorization of the existing 
hierarchy of labor power or to the idea that the discrepancy in labor power in this case is 
not worth mentioning. Such a phenomenon is also present in my second criticism in the 
form of the aforementioned “remainder.” When Zizek figures a “pause” into his speech in 
order to let the microphone echo him, he generates a temporal separation between his 
speech and its amplification. The pause, however, is the result of what is effectively a 
workers’ slowdown. Zizek, as the remainder whose primary relation to this slowdown is 
a redefinition his labor (the assembly and arrangement of an audience), becomes a boss. 
Moreover, he becomes a boss who willingly accepts the slowdown because it is the 
audience he wants. In other words, Zizek the orator communist becomes Zizek the 
profiting martyr. He sacrifices his labor power to the masses in order to coordinate their 
labor in a way which produces profit for him. I can read this as one text in which the 
microphone performs a reorganization of labor relations with the speaker, but in doing so 
I am wedded to the idea that such a reorganization happens on the terms of a boss who 
intends to sell the product of that reorganization (just as Zizek would go on to do). The 
message here is both clear and vehemently ideological: you get your slowdown because 
management let you have it.  
The aforementioned phenomenon points to the necessity of beginning a rhetorical 
analysis of the human microphone with an assumption that it organizes a multiplicity of 
text, since it is a prerequisite to understanding the human microphone as a technology for 
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the expression of an agency which emanates from agents (rather than as a prefiguration 
the possibilities available to them). In other words, the rhetorical power of the human 
microphone is that it presents the critic with a situation which is wholly aleatory: labor is 
capable of organizing in a way which is not dependent on any historical inevitability or 
existing power structures, while at the same time retroactively organizing its relationship 
to them both. The voices of the human microphone therefore reveal a persistent political 
question at the heart of rhetorical criticism: which of these bodies aren’t worth talking 
about in their own right? If rhetorical criticism is to be worthy of the latter half of its 
name, it cannot afford to enter that discussion having already sectioned off a set of those 
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